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ABSTRACT
ROVER: A DNS-BASED METHOD TO DETECT AND PREVENT IP HIJACKS
The Border Gateway Protocol (BGP) is critical to the global internet infrastructure. Unfortu-
nately BGP routing was designed with limited regard for security. As a result, IP route hijacking
has been observed for more than 16 years. Well known incidents include a 2008 hijack of YouTube,
loss of connectivity for Australia in February 2012, and an event that partially crippled Google in
November 2012. Concern has been escalating as critical national infrastructure is reliant on a se-
cure foundation for the Internet. Disruptions to military, banking, utilities, industry, and commerce
can be catastrophic.
In this dissertation we propose ROVER (Route Origin VERification System), a novel and prac-
tical solution for detecting and preventing origin and sub-prefix hijacks. ROVER exploits the
reverse DNS for storing route origin data and provides a fail-safe, best effort approach to authen-
tication. This approach can be used with a variety of operational models including fully dynamic
in-line BGP filtering, periodically updated authenticated route filters, and real-time notifications
for network operators.
Our thesis is that ROVER systems can be deployed by a small number of institutions in an
incremental fashion and still effectively thwart origin and sub-prefix IP hijacking despite non-
participation by the majority of Autonomous System owners. We then present research results
supporting this statement. We evaluate the effectiveness of ROVER using simulations on an Inter-
net scale topology as well as with tests on real operational systems. Analyses include a study of
IP hijack propagation patterns, effectiveness of various deployment models, critical mass require-
ments, and an examination of ROVER resilience and scalability.
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In April of 1997 a small ISP in Florida crippled the Internet for two hours due to a router mis-
configuration [5]. Their unintentional error caused a router to send incorrect BGP announcements
to neighboring routers which naively accepted them and continued to propagate them onwards.
The erroneous announcements spread widely resulting in a flood of traffic to the ISP that over-
whelmed their capacity and triggered the outage. Even though it was an accident, this was the first
documented case of IP hijacking.
In 2008, a Pakistan ISP performed an intentional hijack of a YouTube address block, attempting
to censor content in Pakistan only [4]. Unfortunately the ISP’s route filters incorrectly leaked the
route to neighboring routers which propagated the announcement across the world. This effectively
took YouTube offline for 45 minutes.
As recently as February 2012 millions of people across the entire continent of Australia were
taken offline for 45 minutes due to a BGP filter error that created a routing valley [45]. Tier-1 traffic
from Telstra and Optus were mistakenly routed through a much smaller regional ISP, overwhelming
their capacity and causing the outage. And in November 2012, Google was partially crippled when
a small Indonesian ISP announced the wrong address space.
These examples, spanning sixteen years of internet history, demonstrate the severity of IP hi-
jacking. Attacks both large and small continue to this day. Some have consequences large enough
to be publicized in the popular press.
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1.1. Problem Statement
IP Hijacks can occur by accidental misconfiguration or by malicious intent. When malicious,
a hijack can be used to blackhole address blocks, effectively removing organizations from the
Internet. They can also be used to intercept traffic or impersonate a victim’s website. Organizations
are mostly defenseless. Firewalls and Intrusion Protection Systems can do nothing to prevent the
attack; the vulnerability is at a much lower level, within the fundamental routing mechanism of the
Internet itself.
Recognized as a problem for many years, IP hijacking is becoming even more of a hot topic as
internet organizations and governments voice their concerns. The U.S. Department of Homeland
Security views IP hijacking as a fundamental cyber-security topic. FCC Chairman Julius Gena-
chowski recently called IP hijacking one of the top three cyber-security threats, the others being
bot-nets and DNS hacking [29].
The root cause of this problem is that, unfortunately, BGP routing was designed with only lim-
ited regard for security. To address this shortcoming, many academic papers have been published
over the past years that propose a variety of solutions for detecting and preventing IP hijacks. IETF
working groups have also developed proposals and testbeds for solutions such as S*BGP (Secure
BGP and its variants). Their current work focuses on RPKI (Resource Public Key Infrastructure),
a method to publish authorized route origins in a cryptographically signed certificate hierarchy.
These approaches will be summarized in Chapter 2.
Despite the potentially serious consequences of IP hijacks, none of these solutions have been
widely deployed. Reasons usually cited are cost, complexity and lack of consensus. Many ISPs do
not view their risk as large enough to warrant investment. Nevertheless, a number of organizations
including critical national infrastructure have a very high risk and require a working, deployed
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solution. This creates a dilemma in that critical sites need to be protected despite lack of action
from the majority.
1.2. Thesis Statement and Contributions
Given the context and historical background, this dissertation focuses on the problem of origin
and sub-prefix hijacks. Our thesis statement is “A system based on the existing DNS infrastructure
can be deployed by a small number of institutions in an incremental fashion and still effectively
thwart origin and sub-prefix IP hijacking despite non-participation by the majority of Autonomous
System owners.”
To prove this statement a number of novel concepts and tools had to be developed. These are
listed in section 8.1 and include the ROVER domain naming convention and validation algorithm.
A live internet testbed was developed and a global internet simulation tool was written to perform
various research experiments. Graphical visualization programs were also written to help build
insights regarding IP attacks and defenses. New internet topology metrics, depth and reach are
introduced. Finally, the research results and measurements were performed in support of the thesis
statement.
1.3. Research Objectives
This dissertation proposes a novel invention called “ROVER”, an acronym for Route Origin
VERification. ROVER is small set of mechanisms that enable practical solutions for the detection
and prevention of origin and sub-prefix hijacks. An conceptual overview of ROVER is depicted in
Figure 1.1.
ROVER exploits the existing reverse DNS infrastructure as a means for storing and retrieving
owner-authorized route origin data. These DNS data are cryptographically protected from fraud
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Figure 1.1. ROVER Design Model
by DNSSEC signing and validation mechanisms. The ROVER algorithm provides a fail-safe, best
effort approach to route origin authentication. ROVER mechanisms can be incorporated into a
variety of operational models including fully dynamic in-line BGP filtering, periodically updated
authenticated route filters, and a hijack detection system that issues real-time notifications for net-
work operators.
A feasibility study of ROVER was performed by developing a live Internet testbed employing
a web-based user interface. Participants in the testbed could publish route origins in the reverse-
DNS using a built-in provisioning system. As more and more data was published, the testbed was
used for measuring query performance, assessing architectural tradeoffs, finding and fixing design
flaws, and other useful experiments. The testbed also implemented an IP hijack detector which
compared a real-time stream of BGP announcements to data retrieved from the DNS.
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The next step was to perform analytic research. Several questions were posed to build the case
for ROVER. The most obvious high-level questions are “does it really work?”, “how well does it
work?” and “what are its issues and limits?” Other questions include:
• What system measurements are relevant?
• Is there a critical mass threshold required before ROVER can be considered globally
useful? How many detectors are necessary? Where should they be placed?
• What is the impact to the DNS system in terms of load, fanout, robustness, failures, real-
time capable, etc. Does DNS cause a circular dependency with BGP?
• What are the threat models to ROVER. Can the vulnerabilities be prevented or mitigated?
• Can a reliable system be built when ROVER’s core dependency is based on a potentially
unreliable DNS?
These questions were investigated with a variety of tools including simulation, the construction
of a real-world ROVER testbed, DNS measurements, etc. To provide structure to the research, a
set of four research goals were defined and pursued for this dissertation.
(1) Characterize IP Hijack propagation.
(2) Measure the effectiveness of the proposed solution.
(3) Characterize the limits and resiliency of the proposed solution.
(4) Measure the scalability and impact of the proposed solution on the Global DNS.
This research created some interesting and occasionally surprising results. We were able to
formulate several new metrics that correlate attack vulnerability with a router’s position in the
Internet topology. We determined that a deployment strategy for protecting Internet routing that
only places filters at the Tier-1 ISPs does not work. We found techniques to mitigate DDoS and
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other attack vectors that attempt to thwart the ROVER operations. We also determined that the
global DNS infrastructure has the capacity and scalability to support the load posed by ROVER.
The remainder of this dissertation is organized as follows. Chapter 2 gives a brief overview
of BGP essentials and a survey of prior work related to IP hijacks. Chapter 3 describes the func-
tional and operational design of ROVER. Chapters 4, 5, 6, and 7 discuss the research conducted
and results obtained. Finally we summarize conclusions and contributions in Chapter 8 and list
publications and presentations in Chapter 9.
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CHAPTER 2
BACKGROUND AND RELATED WORK
This chapter surveys current knowledge of IP hijacking: how it occurs, its effects, and what
previous solutions have been proposed.
These topics are organized as follows. Section 2.1 reviews the basics of inter-domain routing
using the Border Gateway Protocol. Section 2.2 surveys vulnerabilities in routers and in the BGP
protocol itself, then explores a range of IP hijacking methods, limitations, and evasion techniques.
Section 2.3 examines a taxonomy of detection and mitigation techniques utilizing information from
the router control and data planes. We conclude in Section 2.4 with an examination of hijacking
importance in terms of magnitude, effects, and whether any of the proposed detection or mitigation
techniques is likely to be widely deployed relative to cost and benefits.
2.1. Border Gateway Protocol
2.1.1. BGP Fundamentals. This section describes only the aspects of BGP and related termi-
nology [42] that are relevant to IP hijacking and its detection. Comprehensive information on BGP
is otherwise widely available.
The Internet is comprised of a set of independent sub-networks called Autonomous Systems
(AS). There are currently over 60,000 ASes distributed around the world. Each AS may be assigned
or allocated one or more blocks of IP addresses designated by a CIDR prefix (e.g. 129.82/16). The
AS owning the prefix is referred to as the “origin AS”.
Routing tables are constructed as BGP UPDATE and WITHDRAW messages are received by
a router from its adjacent neighbors. An UPDATE message specifies a prefix and a path vector of
sequential AS numbers specifying the route back to the origin AS. BGP avoids loops by having
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each router examine the path and ignoring an announcement if it see that its own AS number is
present. Router data structures include:
• RIB: Routing Information Base
– Adj-RIBs-In: raw routing data sent by neighbors.
– Loc-RIB: actual route chosen from Adj-RIBs-In.
– Adj-RIBs-Out: routing data to be sent to neighbors.
• FIB: Forwarding Information Base – used to forward a packet to its next hop.
In a nutshell, BGP route announcements are propagated as follows: the origin AS announces
a prefix and its AS number to its neighboring ASes. If the new route is “better” than those in a
router’s existing tables, the router will prepend its own AS number to the path and propagate the
new route to its set of neighbors. This continues until the route is fully propagated and globally
stable. An example route propagation is illustrated in Figure 2.1.
High-speed packet forwarding is controlled by routing entries in the FIB. Note, however, that
if a packet’s IP address matches multiple prefixes stored in the FIB, the most specific prefix always
wins. As an example, consider the case where a FIB contains routes for both 129.82/16 as well
as 129.82.0/18. A packet destined for 129.82.0.10 matches both, but the most specific prefix,
129.82.0/18 determines the chosen route.
Choosing the “best route” for insertion into the FIB is a key factor in BGP routing (and in BGP




(3) NETWORK or AGGREGATE
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Figure 2.1. AS Path Propagation (from [19])
(4) Shortest AS PATH
(5) followed by 9 other attributes
The two most important of these attributes with respect to IP hijacking are LOCAL PREF and
SHORTEST AS PATH.
2.1.2. AS relationships. The communication between one AS and another is often classified
according the their business relationship:
• Transit Provider: is paid by a customer to provide connectivity to the internet
• Customer: connects to a provider and pays for data transfer
• Peer: neighbors that agree to interconnect and exchange routing information; typically no
money changes hands. Note that ISP business relationships are typically confidential. A
peer relationship may never be disclosed to the general public.
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• Sibling: Peer ASes typically owned or managed by the same organization, perhaps be-
cause of a business acquisition.
The economics of an AS relationship imply that an ISP would prefer to route traffic through a
peer if possible, rather than pay a provider for transit. Also, routes received from a peer should not
be advertised by an AS because this would inadvertently cause the peer to transit traffic it shouldn’t
be responsible for. Routing valleys should be avoided (provider to customer to provider) because
this can cause horrible traffic problems due to overload. These behaviors are managed by BGP
routing policies.
Another AS classification used by many of the research papers describe an ISP as being a tier-1,
2 or 3 provider. This is illustrated in Figure 2.2 and defined as follows:.
• Global Tier-1: transit-free; connect to entire net without purchasing transit from anyone;
they only peer to other tier-1s; approximately 15-20 ISPs
• Regional Tier-1: may purchase transit, but cover a whole country or region without peer-
ing; approximately 200 ISPs
• Tier-2: purchases some transit and does peering with other networks/exchanges; there are
approximately 3500 ISPs in the US, 100,000 ISPs world-wide, plus the large enterprises
who run their own tier-2 networks (perhaps 5000)
• Tier-3: A network that solely purchases transit from other networks to reach the Internet
2.1.3. Routing Policy. BGP by itself has no knowledge of a customer, provider or peer rela-
tionship. These relationships are managed by defining a router policy that controls the behavior
of the autonomous system. Policies can be applied individually to internal and external routes and
can control the propagation of routes.
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Figure 2.2. Internet Tiers (from wikipedia)
A Routing policy is implemented by applying route filters and route maps. Route filters control
which routes are to be advertised (egress filter) and which can be received (ingress filter). Route
maps are a set of sequential rules that control traffic flow and routing behavior. A route map
verifies whether a route matches the rule, permit or deny the route, and execute commands that
adjust attributes of a route. Attributes include variables such as LOCAL PREF, access-lists, AS-
path prepending, multi-exit discriminator, and community strings to define further behavior and
filtering by other ISPs.
The AS relationships described earlier are managed by setting appropriate router policies. Traf-
fic flow is handled by setting LOCAL PREF. Most ISPs assign higher LOCAL PREF values to
customer-routes than to peer-routes than to provider-routes. Route propagation between ASes is
controlled by egress filters:
• customer to provider: export all routes except those of its providers and peers
• provider to customer: export all routes
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Figure 2.3. Example: AS Path Selection
• peer to peer: export customer and sibling routes only
• siblings to sibling export all routes, behave as a single consolidated AS
Filtering is an extremely important part of routing policy. Unfortunately, not everyone sets
filters, or sets them correctly. Errors can cause IP hijacks to propagate widely, or for misconfigu-
rations to propagate via a “route leak”.
To show the interplay between path selection, propagation, and the rule of most-specific-prefix,
consider the example illustrated in Figure 2.3.
AS1 originates a prefix, but for traffic control reasons, sends a /16 to both AS2 and AS8 and
sends a more specific /17 to AS4. Egress filters control the route propagations. The first interesting
situation occurs at AS2. It receives routes from AS1 and a competing route from AS8. The shortest
path rule wins. The next interesting situation is at AS3. It receives a /16 from AS2 and a /17 from
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AS6, but it is not allowed to propagate the /17 to AS7 because it got it from a peer. AS7 only
receives the /16 route.
Given the topology, one could expect that a data packet sent from AS7 to AS1 would follow the
path from 7 through 3 to 2 to 1. What actually happens is different because all routing decisions
are made locally. The packet arrives at AS3 which has a more specific prefix in its FIB, so it
immediately forwards it to AS6. The actual data path is AS7, AS3, AS6, AS5, AS4, AS1 – a path
that is suboptimal in length, but logical in terms of routing policy. A similar example could be
constructed using LOCAL PREF.
2.2. BGP Attack Techniques
BGP was designed at at time when there was implied trust between the various actors. That
world is long gone and hostile actions are now a fact of life. With very few exceptions, IP hijacks
are serious attacks generally used to
• Blackhole – routing traffic away from a victim and dropping the packets, effectively mak-
ing the victim inaccessible.
• Impersonate – instead of dropping the traffic, imitate their websites or other servers. Im-
personating a major DNS server (w/o DNSSEC) would extend the attack to a much wider
area of the net.
• Eavesdrop – listen in on all traffic, perhaps as a man-in-the-middle.
• Spam – send spam email while temporarily hiding in someone else’s address space to
avoid detection.
However, there is at least one benevolent IP poisoning attack described in the paper by Katz-Bassett
et al [26] . This will be described in Section 2.2.5 regarding Machiavellian Routing. Their paper
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also cites references that use benevolent poisoning to uncover hidden network topology and assess
the prevalence of default routes.
This section summarizes the BGP threat model including router platform vulnerabilities, IP
hijacking and evasion techniques, factors that limit the successful launch of a hijack, and the fre-
quency and duration of observed attacks. Many of these issues are described in the 2010 paper by
Butler et al [5] and and the 2011 paper by Huston et al [24]. Both of these papers are comprehen-
sive survey articles, similar in scope, and include very extensive bibliographies. Other papers are
cited as necessary.
2.2.1. Router Platform Vulnerabilities. Launching an IP hijack requires an attacker to directly
control a router or to compromise someone else’s router located at a point that will impact the
intended victim. Routers are vulnerable. Many administrators have never changed their router’s
default password so taking control is as simple as logging on. Otherwise Standard interfaces such
as SSH and Telnet have vulnerabilities that can be exploited.
The next concern is that BGP routers use TCP sessions to communicate with each other. This
allows for another set of vulnerabilities.
(1) Attackers can eavesdrop, alter or inject TCP messages. In fact, an entire TCP session can
be hijacked by forcing router resets and guessing sequence numbers.
(2) Denial of Service attacks (DOS) can be launched in many ways including SYN floods,
data floods, and TCP reset attacks. A MITM attacker can withhold traffic until the BGP
KEEP-ALIVE fails causing complete router table retransmission, effecting a DOS attack.
(3) A TCP replay attack can be used to suppress a route across the internet (blackholing the
victim) by simply repeating a WITHDRAW / UPDATE sequence often enough to trigger
the BGP route flap damping mechanism.
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(4) A man-in-the-middle attack can delay packets so that a router falls behind. THe MITM
can listen in and forge messages, guess sequence numbers and inject harmful messages.
IPSEC is one method to protect against TCP attacks; however few people implement IPSEC.
MD5 with a shared secret key is more generally used and can verify the integrity and source of
the BGP message. Digital signatures verify the payload hasn’t been altered (it can be wrong,
but it hasn’t been altered!) However MD5 has a heavier computation load which creates a larger
opportunity for DOS attacks. Key rollover and scaling is also an issue. But MD5 is better than
nothing.
Another TCP defense is to use the Generalized TTL Security Mechanism (GTSM). In GTSM,
a BGP receiver will discard all packets whose TCP TTL is less than a certain threshold, e.g. 255.
This ensures that a sending router must be within a certain radius of the receiver. More distant
Attack Routers will have a TTL less than 254 and thereby be ignored.
2.2.2. BGP Protocol Vulnerabilities. Huston [24] is quite specific in calling out the threats to
the BPG protocol:
• no mechanism to verify integrity, source and freshness of BGP messages,
• no mechanism to verify prefix/origin,
• no mechanism to verify attributes in UPDATE,
• no mechanism to verify local cache RIB is consistent with current state of forwarding
table.
Given this lack of verification, an attacker is able to craft a variety of invalid BGP messages
resulting in various types of IP hijacks. These are categorized as follows (list compiled from
multiple sources [5, 22], etc.):
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(1) Origin Hijack: also known as a prefix hijack occurs when an AS announces itself as
the origin of someone else’s prefix. The bogus path will propagate depending on policy
and shortest-path rules. Affected ASes are now routed to the the hijacker, making the
legitimate owner unreachable. An origin hijack results in Multiple Origin AS (MOAS)
conflicts [53] unless the prefix being stolen is unused space. A sample origin hijack is
illustrated in Figure 2.4.
(2) Sub-prefix Hijack: is similar to an origin hijack except that the prefix announced is a
smaller subnet of an existing prefix. This hijack will propagate widely because more
specific routes are chosen by traffic forwarding. A sub-prefix hijack does not create a
MOAS conflict.
(3) Next-hop Attack: rather than steal the origin, the attacker places itself as the next-to-last
hop in the path, thereby eliminating a MOAS conflict and making detection harder. This
can be done for both prefix and sub-prefix hijacks.
(4) Path spoofing: In this case the hijacking AS could be placed later in the path, making
it harder to detect. Most paths have an average length less than 4, however, making this
more difficult to launch; indeed, this is the least observed attack method. Spoofing attacks
can also inflate path lengths by repeating an AS number to make a path less desirable.
(5) Stealthy Attack: is carefully crafted path spoofing where the attacking AS is moved up
or down in the path. McArthur and Guirguis [31] analyzed how an attacker could avoid
detection by deflecting only a small portion of the traffic to an AS so that the bulk of the
traffic still arrives. They also demonstrated how trace route could be tricked into returning
spoofed TTL’s, making stealthy attacks even harder to detect.
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Figure 2.4. Origin Hijack (from [5])
(6) Man-in-the-Middle: This attack was made famous at the 2008 DEFCON hacker’s con-
ference in a presentation called “stealing the internet” by Pilosov and Kapela where the
authors showed how it was possible to alter or simply eavesdrop on intercept traffic with-
out being detected. The attack was later written up by Renesys [19].
The MITM attack occurs in steps in which trace route was used to observe paths as a
method to carefully choose a path back to the AS which would remain unaltered. Attacks
were made from a multi-homed AS to other routing paths, and normal BGP loop preven-
tion prevented the propagation of these bad path from the “safe reply path”. The attackers
also silently increased the TTLs of packets in transit to hide the presence of the attacking
AS.
An example of the victim AS with its unaltered reply path, the intercepting AS, and
hijacked paths are illustrated in Figure 2.5.
(7) Data Plane Hijack: In this case the attacker’s router is already in the routing path. No
alterations are made in the control plane. Instead the attacker simply drops, listens in, or
alters the packets in transit.
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Figure 2.5. Man-in-the-Middle Attack (from [19])
(8) Route Valley: Strictly speaking this is more of a misconfiguration than an attack, but the
end result could be a drastic overload at an AS. A valley is typically seen as Provider-
Customer-Provider path. More specifically Gao defines it as after a provider-to-customer
edge or a peer-to-peer edge, the AS path can not traverse customer-to-provider edges or
another peer-to-peer edge [8].
2.2.3. Probability of Launching a Successful Attack. Launching an IP hijack doesn’t mean
it will necessarily succeed. Neighboring routers might have policies that filter out the attack or
choose an alternative path with other preferential attributes.
The research by Ballani et al [1] examined a number of factors that determine the fate of an
attack. Figure 2.6 illustrates 9 cases where a hijack attempt will or will not be accepted by a
neighbor based on peer-customer-provider relationships.
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Figure 2.6. Factors affecting bogus route propagation (from [1])
The authors’ analysis showed that a tier-1 AS can, on average, hijack traffic for a prefix from
another tier-1 AS with 70-75% probability. Hijacking from any AS had a success probability
ranging from 38-63%. They also examined interception (eavesdropping) attacks which require
maintaining a safe route back to the victim. In these cases the probability for any AS to intercept
traffic ranged from 29-48% for any AS, and 52-79% for tier-1 Ases. They verified their projections
against known events and although some cases gave over- or under-estimates, most of the estimates
were accurate. Finally, the authors performed a study to detect intercepting route attacks, but
they had a null result; they could neither detect nor definitively prove that there were no ongoing
interception attacks.
2.2.4. Attack Frequency, Duration, and Extent. Only a few of the papers on IP hijacking quan-
tify the magnitude of the problem. Most of the papers simply cite an example high profile attack but
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give no further data (e.g. the Pakistan/YouTube hijack). The papers that did provide observations
on magnitude are as follows.
Short-lived Prefix Hijacking on the Internet: Booth et al [3] examined data from the Ore-
gon Route-Views project [38] for the month of December, 2005. They created a tree structure
of long-term AS owners for network blocks, and then searched Route-Views for any short-lived
announcements from a different origin or sub-prefix AS announced within each block. Any such
short-lived announcement was suspected of being either a misconfiguration or a potential hijack as
long as they occurred simultaneously. Simple mutually-exclusive changes from one AS to another
were discarded as being a change to a multi-homed backup route. The final step required a manual
test involving WHOIS and RADB to determine the owners of the AS blocks and filtering rules.
An incident was discarded If there was a legitimate relationship. This could create false positives
partially because WHOIS is often out-of-date.
The end result is that with 95% confidence they found between 26 and 95 hijacking incidents
within the month. They also found 750+ misconfigurations and false alarms, many more than
purposeful hijackings.
Large scale leaks: The Network Research Lab at the University of Arizona [36] examined
large-scale route leaks that affected multiple network blocks. Their method was to examine suspi-
cious announcements with respect to a network’s past behavior and identifying abnormal behavior.
They identified five to twenty large leaks each year that lasted from a few minutes to many hours.
Figure 2.7 shows an table of large scale leaks detected in 2009.
The Arizona study had evidence that the hijacks were large in the number of networks attacked
and that since they were seen by multiple vantage points, the attacks spread across a wide area of
the internet. This begs the question: In addition to wide-spread hijacks, are there also attacks that
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Figure 2.7. Large Scale Route Leaks Detected in 2009 (from [36])
are highly localized? How many and how often do they occur? For example, a sub-prefix attack
could be is seen in Europe, or Germany, but not spread to the rest of the world. Unfortunately I
could find no study that analyzed this situation.
Network-level behavior of spammers: In 2005 Ramachandran and Feamster [41] determined
that BGP hijacking is a technique used by a set of sophisticated email spammers to avoid detection.
These spammers would announce a complete /8 for a period of about 10 minutes, send spam from
a scattered range of IP addresses within this /8, and then withdraw the announcement (see fig 2.8).
Traceroute probes sent later showed that 60% to 80% of the addresses that sent spam were found
to be unreachable.
Hijacking a /8 is surprising, but has distinct advantages for hiding the identity of the spammer.
A /8 allows a large range of IP addresses so that email can be sent just once from each address, and
routers typically do not filter /8 announcements. The AS numbers announced were both legitimate
AS numbers as well as reserved AS numbers.
In terms of quantifiable results, the authors put a bound of 1% to 10% of spam being sent with
this method. This would imply that multiple 10-minute announcements were made each day, but
no data is cited in this study.
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Figure 2.8. BGP hijack from email spammers (from [41])
Other findings: The listen-whisper paper [44] refers to a 2002 SIGCOMM paper on router
misconfigurations. The authors claim that misconfigurations result in invalid route announcements
for 200 to 1200 prefixes per day. Other papers indirectly refer to the large number of attacks
that last from a few minutes to an hour or more, implying the need for real-time detection and
prevention if anything realistic is hoped to be accomplished.
2.2.5. Benevolent Attacks: Machiavellian Routing. In contrast to the papers describing nega-
tive attack consequences, one paper describes a positive reason for an AS to poison its own route
announcements. Katz [26] describes the problem when an AS failure causes long-term internet out-
ages (more than 10 minutes, usually many hours). By using the path poisoning technique shown in
Figure 2.9, the authors demonstrated how to bypass the failing AS because it will reject the route
due to loop detection. The origin inflation O-O-O was a clever way to keep path lengths equal
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Figure 2.9. Machiavellian Poisoning Example (from [26])
during and after the removal of a self-poisoning. Their paper also referenced tools that probe the
data plane (Hubble and reverse-traceroute) to determine when an AS failure occurs and how to
detect that the failure has been resolved.
The Machiavellian poisoning technique was only recently proposed and needs much more
study. However, It is unclear how practical and long-lived this approach will be if detection and
prevention techniques nullify its core mechanism.
2.3. Detection and Prevention Techniques
Detection and prevention of IP hijacks requires managing the threat model. BGP routers need
to verify the authenticity and completeness of the information received from others and must be
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able to generate authoritative information that other routers can verify. Lacking such a built-in
system, various other techniques can be used to improve confidence in the correctness of routing
messages, but not necessarily to 100%. This section surveys relevant research papers that describe
BGP security solutions ranging from external monitoring and alerting to comprehensive built-in
solutions which require infrastructure rollover.
These research papers were examined with four criteria in mind: what does the solution do
(detect, reactive mitigation, proactive prevention), how does the solution work, how well does it
work, and how difficult is it to deploy?
Figure 2.10 exhibits a solution taxonomy organized by the first two questions, what does it do
and how does it work.
The third question, how well does it work, is addressed using the following criteria:
• Coverage: which attacks (origin, sub-prefix, path)? does it scale?
• Accuracy: deterministic or probabilistic? does it handle evasion avoidance?
• Speed: real-time or delayed response?
Finally, there is the fourth question – deployment cost. Does the solution require a change to
existing routers or to the BGP protocol itself? Can it be deployed incrementally or does it require a
“flag day”. Is it computationally expensive or require a large external infrastructure such as a PKI?
Is the operational expense of deploying and maintaining the solution high or low? These questions
will be discussed in-line with the solution descriptions and summarized at the end of this section.
We now explore the taxonomy categories; various system names are displayed in bold font. Since
this is a survey paper with a large number of systems to discuss, we present summary descriptions
only, sacrificing depth for breadth.
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Figure 2.10. Solution Taxonomy
2.3.1. Tools and Services. Many of the monitoring solutions rely on historical and real-time
collection of BGP announcements. The Oregon RouteViews project [38] peers with dozens of
routers distributed world-wide and archives the information. Generally RouteViews data is not
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available real-time, there may be a delay of 15 to 30 minutes. Improvements are currently under
way to provide real-time data. RIPE also maintains archives of RIBs and BGP announcements.
The CSU BGPmon project [48] builds on RouteViews and collects data from its own set of
BGP peers to provide an XML data feed of BGP announcements and status messages. Individual
BGPmon stations can be chained together to provide a consolidated real-time XML data feed.
The tools most often cited for probing the data plane are TraceRoute and AS-TraceRoute, an
experimental tool that attempts to associate AS numbers to the IP addresses found in the trace.
However, It is somewhat easy to for hijackers to avoid detection by deceiving TraceRoute via
modification of the TTL in returning packets.
Other tools for determining connectivity and fingerprinting hosts included PING, NMAP,
TCP/ICMP timestamp probing and IP Identifier probing. Many of the papers ran simulations of
their proposals using topology information from CAIDA. Several also used the PlanetLab network
cited as a testbed for running experiments.
It is interesting to note that BGP researchers aren’t the only ones who use these tools. So-
phisticated attackers wishing to avoid detection use TraceRoute and Oregon RouteViews to aid in
cloaking their activities. Apparently research data cuts both ways: defenders can use it to assist in
the detection of hijacks, and attackers can use it to make their attacks more stealthy.
2.3.2. Detection.
2.3.2.1. History-Based Anomaly Detectors - BGP Monitors. This set of solutions was inspired
by a 2001 paper by Zhao et al regarding BGP multiple origin AS (MOAS) [53]. They analyzed
the existence of short-lived MOAS and theorized explanations from faults, misconfigurations, and
multihoming. This led to the development of external monitoring systems to detect prefix hijacks,
and later, sub-prefix hijacks.
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The Prefix Hijacking Alert System (PHAS) [28] is one such monitoring system. Its design in-
corporated multiple BGP data sources from RouteViews and RIPE to allow geographically diverse
vantage points. The basic mechanism was for PHAS to store an “origin set” for each prefix and
detect whether a new announcement added or deleted from this set. In the event of a change to the
set, a notification was sent to registered users of the system. Only the end user could determine if
the change was an actual hijack. PHAS also incorporated several clever features. The detection
method used moving windows and exponential decay to avoid notification flapping. Notifications
were sent digitally signed so they could not be spoofed. They were also set via multiple email paths
in of reachability problems due to the hijack. On the receiving end, the user could set notification
filters to accept or reject a notification; for example, alerts could be suppressed if the change was
to a known backup AS.
In terms of the evaluation criteria, PHAS was limited in that it detected prefix hijacks only (not
sub-prefix), but it scaled well, was near-real-time and simple to deploy.
Several other systems developed along similar lines. UCLA Cyclops [47] uses data from
BGPmon and stores it in a history database. Anomalies can be detected and a user can register for
notifications.
A private BGPmon system [46] maintained by André Toonk performs similarly with a “learn-
ing database”, registration system and alerts. Other monitors mentioned were RIPE MyASN (dis-
continued) and WatchMy.net. A commercial monitoring system, Renesys Routing Intelligence,
combines monitors and alerts with various analytics to keep track of internet reachability. Renesys
peers with a large number of globally distributed routers and also detects sub-prefix hijacks. Their
2009 presentation at Blackhat [4] shows how their system can detect MITM attacks.
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Figure 2.11. Evasion Technique: Attacker A and Victim V announce the same pre-
fix. Attacker A evades Detection from Monitor M due to customer route preference
trumping peer route (from [44])
Monitoring systems are only good at detecting attacks if they have wide visibility. Hijacks can
be limited in scope, and the selection and distribution of monitoring stations is critical to detection.
Monitors are also prone to false positives given legitimate changes that are not in the history.
Furthermore, attackers can use evasion techniques to hide from monitors, as discussed in Zhang’s
Practical Defense paper [51]. An example evasion is illustrated in Figure 2.11.
2.3.2.2. Metric-based Anomaly Detectors (Data Plane). We now summarize five hijack de-
tection systems based on information available in the data plane.
The first, Hu and Mao’s [22] fingerprint system was proposed as a complementary double-
check intended to reduce the number of false positives issued from BGP control-plane monitors.
This was done by detecting data plane differences between an attacking AS and the legitimate
owner AS.
The system uses multiple geographically dispersed stations to send probes along different paths
to addresses in a suspected incident. If possible, a live host would be found at each target, probed
with NMAP, timestamp and other techniques, and then analyzed for differences. Average probing
time was 3 minutes, and was always less than 10 minutes. If the returning fingerprints were the
same, a false positive could be avoided. If different, it strengthened the case for an actual hijack.
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The authors tested their system against a variety of attack scenarios including prefix, sub-prefix,
and next-hop attacks. The results were encouraging: during their tests they were able to reduce the
number of origin hijacks from 10418 suspected to 137 actual attacks.
Zheng et al [54] created a lightweight scheme based on hop-count capability which is real-
time, can be deployed incrementally, and runs completely in the data plane. The system periodi-
cally runs a traceRoute against registered prefixes from multiple vantage points. It records these
and looks for differences in the counts over time. Some differences can be legitimate, some can in-
dicate a hijack. To make the system more robust, they propose counting the hops from a reference
router that is topologically close to the originating AS. (figure 2.12). Although not mentioned in
their paper, a topologically close reference point might also help minimize evasion techniques that
alter information returned from traceRoute.
The system has no dependence on live BGP monitoring. It is based on hop count stability and
AS path similarity only. Alarms are issued when measurements show departure from this stability.
The authors ran experiments with PlanetLab and a simulation system based on real Internet traces.
The results gave high accuracy, with false positive and false negative rates below one-half percent.
This lightweight scheme has a number of desirable attributes, but may be limited in its scal-
ability due to the necessity of carefully choosing reference points. Running 400,000 prefixes to
60,000 ASes requires too much a priori knowledge on the network topology.
The LOCK system proposed by Qiu et al [40] has somewhat different goals. It can run in either
the control or data plane. But rather than detect a hijack, it is designed to locate the offending AS
even if it is buried somewhere deep in a routing path.
LOCK is a system that looks for differences in geographically dispersed AS path measure-
ments. It is based on two observations. First, hijackers cannot manipulate the portion of an AS
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Figure 2.12. Data Plane Detection: PathDisagreement using hop-count and a ref-
erence point (from [54])
path from a polluted vantage point to an upstream neighbor of the hijacker. Second, the trustworthy
portion of AS paths from multiple vantage points to the hijacked victim will converge around the
hijacker AS. Knowing this, the LOCK monitor performs 3 steps: clustering of monitors that have
similar paths to a target AS, ranking the monitors based on probability that its path is polluted, and
selecting the highest ranked monitor in each cluster to watch the target prefix. A location algorithm
then examines the differences between these monitors to determine the offending AS.
The authors tested simulations, reconstructed known hijack attempts, and conducted their own
prefix attacks in PlanetLab; the results were quite accurate in locating the offending AS.
ISPY, proposed by Zhang et al [52], is a unique contribution in its design goals and method.
ISPY is a completely self-contained and self-centric system to be run for an AS on behalf of that
AS. The key idea is for ISPY to periodically perform a light-weight probe to 3000 transit ASes
with traceRoute and PING, looking for cuts in connectivity. If a hijack is occurring, large swaths
of the internet will not return a response to the origin AS; the response will instead be re-directed
to the attacker. ISPY’s detection logic differentiates between the “cut” signature for a hijack vs
normal link outages. When a cut threshold larger than 10 is detected, an alert is sent to operators.
This alert is guaranteed to be received because it is self-AS-originated and does not have to transit
a polluted network. The system was tested with simulations and in PlanetLab, then tested the live
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Figure 2.13. ARGUS hijack detection architecture (from [43])
internet; it’s detection rate was extremely accurate, with low false positive/negatives. Speed was
good; a probe took from approximately 1 to 3 minutes. It is easily deployable since it doesn’t
require vantage points but is self-contained.
ISPY appears to be a promising system, but it has limitations. It is only useful for prefix hijacks,
not sub-prefix. Currently it can only detect that a hijack is occurring, but not who the attackers are.
This means the system would need to be coupled with a mitigation or prevention system. Future
efforts are meant to deal with these issues.
ARGUS [43] is a relatively new detector announced in 2012. ARGUS also compares BGP
data to historical data as the main anomaly detection mechanism, but confirms the observation by
statistical correlation on data obtained from multiple remote vantage points. ARGUS collects this
data from other routers using show ip bgp and ping. Their method is based on the fact that
polluted router usually can not communicate with hosts in the victim’s address space, but normal
routers can. The ARGUS architecture is illustrated in Figure 2.13.
2.3.2.3. Out-of-Band Query Systems. Huston’s survey paper [24] reviews two methods for
verifying route integrity based on out-of-band query systems.
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Figure 2.14. Early BGP+DNS proposal showing problem in sub-allocation (from [24])
IRV (Inter-domain Route Validation) is a method for distributing the information in the Inter-
net Route Registries (IRR) into a set of per-AS route registries that can be queried out of band.
Each AS would then be motivated to keep its information up-to-date. Routers would query the
originating AS’s “IRV companion server” as to the authenticity of a received route. The IRV ar-
chitecture had a number of issues, from finding the server to authenticating the response, and was
never deployed.
The 1998 DNS lookup system designed by Bush and Li was also proposed as a distribution
mechanism for origination information. This idea called for a new DNS zone zone, bgp.in-
addr.arpa, with a new record type, the AS RR. Routers could perform a DNS query to validate
origin data contained in a BGP UPDATE message.
Several issues were identified: what happens when a query isn’t answered? Is the data valid?
(Data Authentication could be done with DNSSEC, but unfortunately DNSSEC was still in its
infancy at this time). The approach only handled origin validation, not path validation. Hus-
ton’s critique also complains that [24] The DNS delegation hierarchy would needed to be precisely
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aligned to the address allocation framework. Limitations to the DNS structure itself are probably
the reason why the approach has never been deployed. An entire address block might be sub-
allocated to a DNS sub-level (allocated “in full”), causing a prefix to refer to the DNS entry that
did the allocation in full instead of the legitimate owner of the prefix. This shortcoming could only
be solved with modifications to DNS. This situation is illustrated in Figure 2.14. We consider this
to be an illegitimate reason for discarding DNS, since the objective is to manage BGP security, not
necessarily to maintain a structure which traces address block provenance.
2.3.3. Reactive Mitigation. Detection systems usually require human intervention to deal with
an incident after it has been observed. Email, SNMP, and Alert Registries have all been proposed
as notification systems. Unfortunately, since many attacks are short-lived, human response time
may be unacceptable.
Zhang et al [51] propose a system in which a detection system communicates with “lifesaver”
routers to execute a route purge/promote to eliminate as many bad paths in a network topology as
possible. The detection system must be real-time, have low false-positives, and identify the victim
and bogus route: the fingerprint system is satisfactory.
Bogus route purging is performed with direct communication to the lifesaver using a router
with Route Control Platform modifications. The Route Promotion technique is clever - it shortens
the AS path by combining many path elements into a single AS Set, raising its preference. Figure
2.15 shows how some, but not all, ASes are affected after a bogus route purge (requires Route
Control System at router) and a route promote.
The overall system is incrementally deployable and reduces polluted routes by as much as 57%
with a small number of lifesaver routers, but is never 100% effective.
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Figure 2.15. Reactive Mitigation using Purge-Promote (from [51])
2.3.4. Proactive Prevention. Rather than perform simple hijack detection or after-the-fact mit-
igation, various systems have been proposed to prevent routers from accepting and propagating
bogus routes in the first place. Some of these systems use cryptographic hashes, signatures or PKI
structures which can be computationally expensive and complex to deploy. The first systems we
discuss are more simple.
2.3.4.1. Non-Cryptographic Solutions. The most widely deployed proactive defense is route
filters. An AS should filter announcements from bogons and from its own customers, especially
stub ASes that do not provide transit services for others. When implemented correctly filters can
prevent route leaks. Unfortunately, filtering is not always done correctly; witness the Australian
Dodo incident [45] mentioned in the introduction.
Filtering of bogus routes becomes more difficult when the erroneous information source arrives
from several hops away. To assist in building better filters, Routing Registries were designed to
store prefix ownership, AS connectivity and and routing policies [5]. RADB and the RIPE IRR are
examples of routing registries. Information may be archived using RPSL, an XML extension for
routing policy.
The problem with routing registries is that they are hard to maintain. To be effective, they must
be secure, complete and accurate. Criticism of current registries is that their data can be compro-
mised by an attacker. But the wider problem is that routing data is not kept up-to-date. ISPs merge,
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personnel change, and the data goes stale. Compounding this is that ISPs may reluctantly submit
routing information because this may disclose local policies that the ISPs regard as confidential.
Furthermore, not all ISP’s participate; in fact, not even all tier-1 ISPs participate. Since the tier-1’s
supply access to every worldwide internet destination, this severely limits the effectiveness.
Pretty Good BGP (PG-BGP) described by Karlin et al [25] is a hijack prevention system that
automatically delays the use and propagation of suspicious routes in favor of known alternatives.
This delay lasts until either a human operator verifies the path or until a timeout occurs. PGBGP
must be incorporated into the router’s operating system via a software update.
PGBGP maintains a table of trusted routing information learned from BGP update messages.
The origin isn’t suspicious if it is in a previous history path. Sub-prefixes are also ok if they use
the same AS as the origin.
The system uses two timers, S (suspicious quarantine = 24 hours) and H (history delay = 10
days), based on a study that shows roughly 45% of new origins and prefixes exist for less than 24
hours. A suspicious route is quarantined by setting it to the lowest LOC PREF. The route could get
selected if no better alternative existed. If the route hasn’t been replaced by a new BGP UPDATE
message, it is allowed to be used and propagate once the quarantine period expires. The H timer
is used for startup and removal for entries in the history database. New routes not in the history
database are allowed to build up over 10 days. If they do not stay in the RIB for 10 days, they are
removed from the history database.
The 24 hour delay is long enough for human operators to get an alert and attempt corrective
action. The authors propose an internet alert registry to handle an incident within 24 hours. Only
the instigator and the victim would be alerted, since they are the most likely to be motivated to do
something (and the instigator would only be motivated if it were a misconfiguration).
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The results, based on an AS topology simulation, were impressive. If deployed only to 62
core ASes, PGBGP can protect 97% of ASs from malicious prefix routes and 85% from bogus
sub-prefix routes. If PGBGP were deployed on all ASs, both numbers would exceed 99%.
In evaluating PGBGP, it is incrementally deployable with immediate benefit, but is only effec-
tive if the core adopts it. It does not require any protocol changes. Its deployment cost is high,
however, because it requires changing the router OS. Although it detects anomalies in real-time,
the 24 hour delay may be unacceptable for ASes undergoing traffic management or backup route
switches.
2.3.4.2. Cryptographic Solutions. A comprehensive security model for BGP would verify
BGP messages for authenticity, integrity and authorization – that they come from a verifiable
owner with a verifiably-owned address block. According to Huston [24] One method of prevent-
ing bogus routes is to register all ASs and their prefixes so that routing announcements can be
cryptographically verified.
Cryptographic techniques can use a public key infrastructure (PKI) to establish a chain-of-trust
to ensure message authenticity and integrity. This section summarizes several of these designs plus
an alternative design that avoids the use of PKI entirely.
SBGP is the most comprehensive security architecture proposed. SBGP uses a PKI to digitally
sign route updates as they traverse the network, chaining signatures together for path validation
(see Figure 2.18). Unfortunately SBGP changes everything from the protocol and policies and is
computationally expensive. These issues result in extremely large barriers to SBGP deployment.
And to be effective, it would require full, or at least very wide implementation across the Internet.
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SoBGP (Secure Origin BGP) is a little simpler and relaxes the constraint on path verification.
It provides trade-offs regarding security and protocol overhead, combining proactive security with
anomaly detection.
RPKI (Resource Public Key Infrastructure) is the current proposal with the largest momentum
[23]. RPKI is in active development at the IETF SIDR working group (Secure Interdomain Rout-
ing). It uses ideas from S*BGP, but currently limits itself to origin validation. The larger BGPSec
effort at the IETF follows after RPKI to secure path validation.
RPKI establishes a root of trust and uses a chain of X.509 cryptographically signed certificates
to attest the “right to use” of resources such as an AS number and IP address blocks. Each certifi-
cate in the chain can sub-allocate a resource and attest to its authorization. This allows 3rd party
verification. The X.509 chain is shown in figure 2.16, illustrating the delegations from IANA to
the Regional Internet Registries, to Local Internet Registries and on down.
The PKI structure builds this trust chain, but has complexity issues with certificate distribution
and revocation. More importantly there is the open question on how to deal with legacy IP address
space. Many holders of legacy /8’s are not likely to enter into an agreement with IANA giving them
authority over their address space. Therefore there are likely to be large holes in the certificate
chain.
The next major element of RPKI is the Route Origin Authorization (ROA). A ROA is a digital
object signed by a certificate that contains an AS number and a list of authorized IP address blocks.
It attests that AS X is authorized to originate any of the prefixes in the list. ROAs are published
in the RPKI repository and distributed to routers via an as yet undetermined mechanism. Once
there, the ROA can be used to proactively filter a prefix announcement: it will allow a prefix
announcement if the origin matches as valid, deny an announcement (by setting LOCAL PREF
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Figure 2.16. RPKI certificate hierarchy (from [23])
very low) if the origin is bogus, or do nothing if there is no matching ROA. This is illustrated in
Figure 2.17.
The good news is that compared to S*BGP, RPKI can be incrementally deployed. On the other
hand, there is much debate over the practicality and barriers to deployment for RPKI. There is
already a mistrust of PKIs in general. Router code has to be updated or new infrastructure rolled
out. Already complicated router policy has to change. Creation of the first batch of signed ROAs
had hundreds of errors, which would cause operational errors [49]. These are all the subjects of test
labs at RIPE, NIST and other places. Even if some elements can be simplified, the ISP operator
community may be reluctant to deploy a system as complex as RPKI.
Cryptographic solutions offer strong authentication, but as mentioned, there is much criticism
and reluctance to using a PKI. An interesting alternative is the system proposed by Subramanian
et al [44] called LISTEN/WHISPER. This is a two-part solution: Listen checks the data plane
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Figure 2.17. Detecting an origin hijack using a ROA (from [23])
to determine whether destination routes are working. Whisper uses cryptographic functions in the
control plane to detect bogus routes.
Whisper does NOT rely on a PKI. Instead it uses RSA signatures that are attached to a BGP
update message in the community string. This eliminates the need for a BGP protocol change, but
does require router software modification. Each succeeding router adds its signature to the chain.
But without a PKI, how do we check the signature? The solution is to compare the signatures from
two distinct paths, if they are different, one of them must be bogus (see Figure 2.18). If they are
the same, either both are good, or both are bogus. Bogus routes were assigned penalties in the
routing policy so they would be less likely to be chosen. Note that this system requires ubiquitous
deployment to detect inconsistent routes.
Listen complements whisper by passively checking the data plane using libpcap. This is differ-
ent from prior data-plane solutions which do active probing. In its simplest form, listen determines
that a TCP flow is complete if it observes a SYN packet followed by a DATA packet, otherwise
it is incomplete if no response is heard within 2 minutes. Much more has to be done to deal with
false negatives and colluding attackers; in fact, smart adversaries can defeat LISTEN.
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Figure 2.18. S-BGP vs Whisper (from [44])
The combination of listen/whisper gives very good results, given its cryptographic nature and
reachability double-check, but it is still non-deterministic. Additionally, the deployment costs are
much too high for the incremental benefit gained.
2.4. Factors Affecting Solution Deployment
All of the solutions surveyed have strengths and weaknesses. Despite the range of approaches
presented, we argue that none of the surveyed systems is likely to see widespread deployment.
This concern has also been raised by Butler, Rexford et al [5]. The main blockers to deployment
are largely cost and complexity.
No one disputes that IP hijacking can have serious consequences. The controversy is in whether
the cost of implementing any of the proposed solutions is worth the effort.
40
Importance to any particular stakeholder is a relative term. To characterize stakeholder impor-
tance we use a standard formula from IT risk assessment:
cost < probability ∗magnitude of loss.
That is, the expected loss from “doing nothing” must exceed the cost to “buy an insurance policy”
or there is no motivation to act. If the loss is low or the probability is low, the issue won’t be
important to the stakeholder.
If all things were statistically equal, the probability of experiencing a hijack is quite low. A
recent paper describing the Argus detection system [43] states that over a period of one year the
authors observed 220 stable hijackings among 40,000 BGP anomalies. It took less than two min-
utes for some of these attacks to spread across 90% of the internet. 20% of these lasted less than
10 minutes. These numbers are reasonably close to those in the 2006 paper by Booth et al [3] that
measured 26 to 95 hijackings in one month.
Using these numbers, we can calculate the probability of a hijack among one of 60,000 au-
tonomous systems as being 220/60000 = 0.36% per year, assuming equal distribution of
attack targets. Any single ISP is unlikely to be motivated by such a low number. (Note, however,
some targets are MUCH more attractive than others, raising a particular organization’s probability
significantly). Probability is only one factor in the equation, however. Loss is the other
factor. And, as we shall see, the loss potential among various stakeholders varies dramatically.
To illustrate, we show the broad range of risk exposure borne by various ISPs. At the highest
end, we have the October 16, 2012 issue of CNET quoting U.S. Defense Secretary Leon Panetta,
“A cyber-attack perpetrated by nation states or violent extremist groups could be as destructive as
the terrorist attack on 9/11. Such a destructive cyber-terrorist attack could virtually paralyze the
nation. They could use these kinds of cyber tools to gain control of critical switches. They could,
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for example, derail passenger trains or even more dangerous, derail trains loaded with lethal
chemicals. They could contaminate the water supply in major cities or shutdown the power grid
across large parts of the country. The most destructive scenarios involve cyber actors launching
several attacks on our critical infrastructure at one time, in combination with a physical attack
on our country. Attackers could also seek to disable or degrade critical military systems and
communication networks. The collective result of these kinds of attacks could be a cyber-Pearl
Harbor.”
Also on the high-risk side are major corporations hosting e-commerce sites. Even a brief outage
due to a hijack could result in a loss ranging from thousands to millions of dollars. As stated in
the U.S. Department of Commerce 2013 second quarter report [37], “The Census Bureau of the
Department of Commerce announced today that the estimate of U.S. retail e-commerce sales for
the second quarter of 2013, adjusted for seasonal variation, but not for price changes, was $64.8
billion, an increase of 4.9 percent (0.9%) from the first quarter of 2013.” This equates to $700
million per day, or half a million dollars per minute, for all online transactions spread evenly over
the time period.
Transactions are not spread evenly, however. There are volume differences between large and
small e-commerce sites and there are also large swings in seasonality, especially during the Christ-
mas holiday season.
To illustrate seasonality: According to the U.S. Department of Commerce, total online revenue
for 2012 was $225.5 billion. The web measurement firm comScore states a lower figure, $186.2
billion. If revenues were spread evenly across the year, each day would result in $510 million
online revenue. In contrast, comScore states that online revenues for the holiday shopping period
were $56.78 billion, or 30% of the total revenue. Green Monday (the Monday 10 days before
42
Table 2.1. E-commerce statistics for 2012 sourced from comScore, annual reports
and private communications
Annual Average Day High Sales Day
Revenue $ per minute $ per minute
U.S. Total online sales 186,200 MM$ 326 K$ 787 K$
Amazon 61,090 MM$ 106 K$ 258 K$
Large Computer Corp 2,250 MM$ 3.9 K$ 9.5 K$
Christmas, otherwise known as the last chance to buy before it is too late) is the largest volume day
with $1.133 billion in online revenue. This is 2.2 times larger than the evenly spread rate, and is
0.6% of the total online revenue. Assuming the holiday season is 90 days, the other 275 days have
a lower average rate of $470 million per day.
Table 2.1 presents a summary of these figures and also estimates online sales rates for Amazon
and a large computer manufacturer. Other large online retailers not illustrated include Google,
Apple, Wal-Mart, Target, Sears, Best Buy and Macy’s.
At the low-risk end, we have the very large number of small and medium ISPs that simply do
not expect much loss if they should experience a hijack. For them, it appears that the problem
doesn’t really have an impact unless they have a critical customer willing to pay for a solution.
They have little motivation or profit incentive to deploy a solution on their own. This lack of
urgency at the low end drags down the deployment effort needed by the highly impacted organiza-
tions.
To make matters worse, if a highly impacted retailer is the subject of an IP hijack, it is quite
possible that thousands of ASes, both large and small, will have a bogus route to the retailer. These
thousands of ASes will be unable to reach the retailer’s web site. The important fact is that you
must not just protect the retailer’s AS. It is these thousands of other ASes that need protection
because they host the bulk of the buying customers.
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In other words, there is a strong inter-dependence between ASes. Just because an ISP doesn’t
host a ”critical retailer” doesn’t mean that they don’t host ”critical customers for other retailers”.
This inter-dependence requires an IP hijacking solution that prevents bogus routes at both large
and small ASes. Many of the proposed detection and prevention techniques require a critical mass
of ISPs to participate in the solution. This inter-dependence therefore sets the stage for several
deployment objectives:
• the solution must not require the participation of everyone, nor require a “flag-day” event.
It must be able to be incrementally deployed.
• a proposed solution must be cost-effective for all parties involved. It must not require
replacement of existing infrastructure (new routers), nor expensive investment in new
infrastructure.
• the solution must be easy to understand and deploy. Complexity is the enemy.
• the solution should fail-safe. In fact, risk from human error must be minimized. If an ISP
makes a mistake, it must not jeopardize the ISP or impact the remainder of the internet.
• the solution must have strong detection capabilities, minimizing false positives and nega-
tives. Prevention mechanisms must act in a timely manner.
Any solution that does not meet these needs is unlikely to be accepted or deployed. They will
be simply ignored.
In general, most of these solutions surveyed do not meet these objectives. They are either
incomplete, too weak, too complex, too costly, or do not allow incremental deployment. The level
of AS participation required for the solution to be effective varies among the solutions. Anomaly
detectors require no participation. Mitigation and prevention solutions vary: some require critical
mass at the core, some require total participation.
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Figure 2.19. Proposed Solutions evaluated against Deployment Factors
These attributes are summarized in Figure 2.19. The ideal solution must have strong authenti-
cation for prefix origins so that its detection mechanism avoids false positive and negative alarms.
The solution must be able to be incrementally deployed, and must be cost-effective, requiring no
router changes (other than some minor configuration), or new infrastructure deployment. Other
factors include simplicity and ease-of-use. Operators will not deploy something they do not under-
stand or fear will cause more problems than it solves. Finally, there is the issue of critical mass.
The internet does not have a governing body which can mandate participation in a BGP hijacking
solution. Simply put, a large majority of ASes will see no benefit in spending money on a problem
that barely affects them.
Given this argument, one can examine the solutions in Figure 2.19 and make the following
conclusions:
• First, DETECTORS are low-impact; an accurate, real-time system such as ARGUS may
be used by interested parties
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• Second, The only likely survivor from the mitigation/prevention category is RPKI. All
other solutions fail to meet the objectives and BGPSEC is too invasive.
• Third, even RPKI is unlikely to be widely deployed due to its deployment costs, data
distribution method and router upgrades. PKIs are complex, have had trust issues with
hacking and multiple trust anchors, and revocation lists are difficult to manage.
• Fourth, these shortcomings leave room for new proposals that better match the design
objectives and deployment costs. This dissertation proposes ROVER to fill that role.
• Finally, it is naive to believe that a “better mousetrap” will be naturally accepted. There is
much momentum and investment behind RPKI. It may be too late for a new proposal, or
too complex for two solutions (RPKI and ROVER) to mutually co-exist, handling overlaps
and possibly contradictory data declarations.
In the end, it may be that one, two, or none, of these solutions is deployed. If the answer is
“do nothing”, then much more serious work will need to be done to bolster the current approach to
IP hijacks – find a method to do better prefix filtering. Unfortunately better filtering cannot really
be done without a secure source of authoritative route origin data. To meet this need, as well as
to provide mechanisms for hijack detection, this dissertation proposes ROVER as a solution that




Stripped to its essentials, ROVER is simply a method for publishing and retrieving route origin
data via the publicly available reverse-DNS infrastructure. These DNS data are protected from
fraud by requiring the use of the DNSSEC extension to DNS.
The ROVER mechanisms by themselves do not directly perform IP hijack detection and pre-
vention. Instead, ROVER is an enabling technology. The ROVER mechanisms are meant to be
embedded into other fully functional applications. For example, ROVER can be incorporated into
a variety of operational models including fully dynamic in-line BGP filtering, periodically up-
dated authenticated route filters, and a hijack detection system that issues real-time notifications
for network operators.
This chapter explains the ROVER design principles and architecture. It then describes the
ROVER components: the DNS naming convention, resource records for publishing ROVER data,
and the ROVER validation algorithm. The chapter ends with a description of the live Internet
testbed as an example of a ROVER application.
3.1. ROVER Design Principles
The ROVER design was deeply influenced by the fact that other solutions to the IP hijacking
problem were not being widely deployed. Because of this, we developed a list of key design prin-
ciples based on the solution deployment objectives outlined in Section 2.4 (e.g. allow incremental
deployment, be cost-effective and fail-safe). The ROVER design principles are:
• Use DNSSEC signed reverse-DNS as an out-of-band advisory mechanism to store and
retrieve authoritative BGP origin data.
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• Use the existing cryptographic root-of-trust and infrastructure since it has been deployed
and has solved the political issues associated with internet governance.
• Assure the system will not break what is working today and must fail-safe. When dis-
abled, routing will work just as it does today without ROVER. When enabled, ROVER
protection enhances BGP security.
• Any viable solution must be publicly checkable. Anyone must be able to ask “which AS
originates this address block”?
• The solution must be cost-effective and align operational costs with benefits. There should
be incentives for keeping origin data published and up-to-date.
• Manage operational issues with IP address ownership and assignment
– IP Address owners must be able to maintain their own authorization information
– An IP address owner must be able to directly authorize origin, transit and other
BGP route security information.
– If an owner assigns an IP address block to a 3rd party, they an act either as an
agent, or delegate publishing authority to that 3rd party.
ROVER relies on existing DNS and no changes are made to the DNS protocol. End applications
that perform verification must understand the naming convention and the resource record types.
Verification also requires support for DNSSEC. Again, no changes in the DNSSEC protocol or
behavior are introduced.
3.2. ROVER Design Model
Figure 3.1 illustrates the ROVER design model. The base of the hourglass depicts the re-use
and leverage of a large set of deployed, well-understood, and well-tested infrastructure components
centered around the reverse-DNS itself. Using existing infrastructure lowers the entry barriers in
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Figure 3.1. ROVER Design Model
terms of cost, ease-of-use, and understanding. This infrastructure also lends itself to rapid dis-
semination of data. An ISP can add or delete origin information via DNS updates and they will
be available world-wide within minutes, as opposed to other techniques such as PKI distribution
methods and certificate revocation. It is important to note that ROVER makes no changes to this
base infrastructure. In particular, ROVER makes no protocol changes and requires no modifica-
tions to any DNS server, cache, or resolver implementation.
The key to the design lies in the small neck of the hourglass depicted in Figure 3.1. Only a
small set of ROVER methods are common to all applications. These include:
• A DNS naming convention for CIDR address blocks. This naming convention covers
both legacy address space and the address blocks assigned from IANA’s Regional Internet
Registries.
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• A set of DNS resource records for publishing BGP route data
• DNSSEC authentication using an internationally agreed root-of-trust signing key. (RPKI
has not settled on a single root of trust at this time).
• “Best Effort” retrieval. Any failure to retrieve data must be handled at the higher level
application layer.
Finally, the large top of the hourglass depicts the broad range of ROVER-based applications.
This system is intentionally designed to allow ISP and other organizations to run their shops in their
own unique preferred operational manner and not dictate a single solution or operational process.
Some ISPs will prefer to use IP hijack detection and alerts. Some will want to deploy a preventive
mechanism. Still others may want to verify IRR and RADB information to build route filter lists.
Some ISPs may do nothing more than publish origin data in the reverse-DNS and let other ISPs
deal with hijack incidents.
3.3. ROVER Publishing
ROVER publishes data in the DNS by introducing two new components; a new naming con-
vention that uniquely names a prefix and new DNS resource records used to store routing data. For
example, ROVER provides a unique DNS name for the prefix 129.82.128.0/18 and stores a DNS
resource record at that name which authorizes ASN 12145 to announce the prefix.
3.3.1. The ROVER Naming Convention. The reverse DNS has a standard naming convention
defined for both IPv4 and IPv6 addresses. The most common use of these names is to associate
an IP address with a host name by means of a PTR resource record. As an example, IP address
129.82.138.2 is encoded as domain name 2.138.82.129.in-addr.arpa (note the simple
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reversal of octets in the domain name). A PTR record retrieved from that DNS domain name
identifies the host as alpha.netsec.colostate.edu.
The reverse DNS naming convention is designed to handle a single address at a time. ROVER,
however, needs a method that can specify a block of addresses, not just a single host address.
Address blocks are written in CIDR “/”’ notation. The prefix length can be at at any arbitrary
network boundary (for example: 129.82.128/17). The new naming convention must be able to
encode this.
To accomplish this, the ROVER naming convention defined in Algorithm 1 constructs DNS
names that take advantage of the hierarchical tree structure of both the Reverse DNS and the IP
address structure.
• In the DNS naming hierarchy, 128.82.129.in-addr.arpa is logically below
82.129.in-addr.arpa, which is logically below 129.in-addr.arpa. Other
flat approaches to naming, such as Distributed Hash Tables, have been proposed, but the
DNS tree structure remains a powerful abstraction. It forms the basis for the operation of
DNS; caching, delegation, DNSSEC signing, and so forth all benefit from the DNS tree
structure.
• Similar to the DNS hierarchy, IP addresses also have a logical tree structure where
129.82.128.0/24 is subprefix (logically below) 129.82.0.0/16 which is a subprefix of
129.0.0.0/8.
This alignment between the DNS hierarchy and the IP address hierarchy serves both systems
well. It also allows one to easily encode prefixes that fall on an octet boundary (e.g. IPv4 prefixes
whose mask length is a multiple of 8). The challenge is to preserve this alignment even when
CIDR prefixes do not fall on octet boundaries. For example, 129.82.128.0/19 is a subprefix of
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Algorithm 1 Pseduocode to convert an IP prefix in CIDR notation to a reverse DNS name. This
is for IPv4. IPv6 is similar but operates at nibble instead of octet boundaries.
function CONVERTTOREVERSEDNS( IPprefix)
octets← IPprefixaddress // Split IP prefix into address and length
prefixLength← IPprefixprefix
bitCount← prefixLength mod 8 // number of leftover bits
reversedOctets← reverse(octets) // Reverse the octets
if bitCount = 0 then // at octet boundary?
return ’m.’+ reversedOctets+ ’.in-addr.arpa’ // at octet boundary
else // not at octet boundary
firstOctet, lastOctets← splitOnce(reversedOctets,′ .′) // peel off first octet
DNSname← ’m.’+ lastOctets+ ’.in-addr.arpa’
bitMask = [128, 64, 32, 16, 8, 4, 2, 1]
index← 0
while index 6= bitCount do // Add in the binary subdomains for leftover bits






129.82.128.0/18. The DNS name for 129.82.128.0/19 should be logically below the DNS name
for 129.82.128.0/18.
Previous attempts at constructing DNS names for prefixes have not captured this rela-
tionship. Most notably, [2] proposed to encode the prefix 10.1.128/20 as the DNS name
128/20.1.10.bgp.in-addr.arpa. One important limitation of this approach is that it
does not reflect the IP address allocation hierarchy. To see this, consider the prefixes 10.1.128/20
and 10.1.128/21. In the IP hierarchy, prefix 10.1.128/20 is the parent of 10.1.128/21. This
relationship is not captured in the DNS hierarchy. Instead, the DNS names are encoded
as siblings and this creates a host of management problems. Specifically, the 10.1.128/21
is encoded as 128/21.1.10.bgp.in-addr.arpa and prefix 10.1.128/20 is encoded as
128/20.1.10.bgp.in-addr.arpa. When viewed as DNS names, they are siblings.
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Table 3.1. IP prefixes mapped to Reverse-DNS domain names
In contrast, the ROVER naming scheme captures the fact that 10.1.128/20 is the parent of
10.1.128/21. Since the DNS and IP hierarchies aligned, one could delegate 10.1.128/20 to an
organization and that organization could then create records for sub-prefixes such as 10.1.128/21
and could even further delegate that prefix block to yet another organization.
Delegation is achieved by using existing reverse DNS names for the first part of the prefix. The
ROVER naming convention then then switches to binary notation for the last mask mod 8 bits
of the prefix. As can be seen in table 3.1, the result looks like an ENUM or IPv6 reverse-DNS
address; that is, a string of chained sub-names. This name-chaining creates the desired effect of
enabling a DNS zone delegation at any point in the chain. For example, the naming scheme allows
for the creation of two /17s from a /16, two /18s from a /17.
There is one exception to the simple delegation scheme. This exception is necessary for back-
wards compatibility with the existing in-addr.arpa structure. In the IP hierarchy, 129.0.0.0/15
is the parent of 129.0.0.0/16. The existing reverse DNS has already established 129.0.0.0/8 as the
parent of 129.0.0.0/16. The naming convention cannot change this existing structure since it is
already widely deployed. When crossing octet boundaries the naming convention simply requires
placing the delegation at the existing zone. The IP and DNS hierarchies align at all other names.
53
Since the ROVER naming scheme is only a convention it requires no changes to the DNS
servers, caches, or resolvers. It simply provides a way to express a prefix as a unique DNS name.
DNS zone administrators can choose to associate any name with a prefix, but having a common
convention facilities inter-operability between organizations and allows ROVER verifiers to easily
find and authenticate routing data published by other organizations.
In summary, the ROVER naming convention is designed to satisfy the following properties:
(1) Unambiguous: Every possible IP prefix must have a unique name and a name must
uniquely match a single prefix. If there were multiple DNS names for the same pre-
fix, applications might need to query data at each of the multiple names. Worse still,
the different names could contain conflicting information. To avoid this, we require each
prefix have exactly one unique DNS name.
(2) Autonomy: The owner of a reverse-DNS zone file associated with a CIDR address block
should be able to act independently from any other organization when creating or modi-
fying data records within the DNS zone.
(3) Coverage Authority: With the exception of data that has been sub-delegated to a child
zone, the reverse DNS zone must be authoritative for all sub-prefixes below the covering
prefix. Any query for a sub-prefix must be answered with a data record or DNS NXDO-
MAIN response specifying the zone as the authority.
(4) Delegation: It must allow the zone owner to delegate smaller address blocks to a child
zone which will be independently managed.
(5) Conformance: It should align with naming conventions and delegation structures already
in use by the RIRs for in-addr.arpa and ip6.arpa.
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(6) Simplicity: The naming structure should be understandable, or at a minimum, able to be
easily constructed by software provisioning tools and utilities such as DIG.
[10] provides more discussion of the naming convention requirements and provides a more
detailed discussion of both the reverse DNS and previous attempts at naming prefixes. [14] pro-
vides a more comprehensive explanation of the naming convention and also shows how the same
convention works for IPv6 prefixes.
3.3.2. ROVER Resource Records. Having associated a unique name with a prefix, one can now
store data at the prefix and sign the data using DNSSEC.
ROVER introduces a new Secure Route Origin (SRO) resource records to identify authorized
origin Autonomous System Number(s) for a prefix. The SRO record contains one mandatory field,
the Origin ASN for the prefix. The Origin ASN field specifies an AS Number that is authorized
to originate a route announcement for the prefix corresponding to the SRO record’s reverse DNS
name. If a prefix can be announced from multiple AS numbers, then multiple SRO records should
be defined at the domain name corresponding to that prefix.
For example, to authorize AS 12145 as the origin AS for 129.82.0.0/16, one would create an
SRO record with Origin ASN 12145 and store the SRO record at the name m.82.129.in-addr.arpa.
The presence of an SRO record authorizes a prefix to be announced and specifies the origin
ASN. If there is no SRO record present at the domain name, then one of two cases occur. Either
a sub-prefix hijack is occurring, or BGP authentication is not being used in a particular zone. To
distinguish between the two cases, the Route Lock (RLOCK) resource record is used to “opt-in”
the zone to BGP origin authentication. The RLOCK is placed at the apex of a reverse-DNS zone
to indicate that the zone is being used to publish routing information. If this record is present, all
route announcements for the prefixes covered by this zone must be authorized by an SRO record.
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Figure 3.2. Zone file showing RLOCK and SRO records
The effective span of control for an RLOCK is dependent on the structure of the Reverse DNS
zone. A Reverse DNS zone that has no delegations will have a span of control that covers all
prefixes at or below the CIDR prefix specified by the domain name at the zone apex. Any zone
delegation starts a new zone authority. Those prefixes in the delegated zone will not be covered by
the parent zone’s RLOCK.
As an example, consider the zone at 129.82.0.0/16 and assume that it has only one delegation
at 129.82.138.0/24. The 129.82.0.0/16 RLOCK covers all prefixes within the /16 to /32 range with
the exception of prefixes within the 129.82.138.0/24 through /32 range because of the delegation.
The 129.82.138.0/24 administrator could independently choose to provide BGP authentication by
adding an RLOCK to the zone apex or could choose to simply not participate.
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[13] provides a more comprehensive explanation of the resource records. A sample zone file
snippet illustrating both the naming convention and the resource records is illustrated in figure 3.2.
As a final note, Chapter 7 discusses recent modifications to the SRO and RLOCK records that
add fields for flags, activation time, and prefix-limit. These fields were added to handle operational
issues that could occur during initial publishing and during delegation of an IP prefix to another
owner. The full discussion is in Section 7.2.
3.4. ROVER Validation Algorithm
Once an organization has published ROVER data in the reverse DNS, anyone can use the
data to authenticate BGP routing announcements. By design, ROVER does not specify how the
data will be used. Our work with different operational networks has shown that there are many
different models. One example is an application to perform near-real-time route origin monitoring
that alerts operators of hijacks. A more aggressive approach directly interacts with a router to
detect and automatically block the perceived hijack. Another application could perform a nightly
analysis that generates router prefix filters. Other applications may not interact with BGP routes
at all; the approaches cross-check data in the Internet Routing Registries (IRR) against the data in
the reverse DNS. This list is not intended to be comprehensive, but instead aims to illustrate the
potential uses of the published data.
To illustrate how ROVER data can be used for verification, we present an example application
that analyzes BGP announcements in real-time as announcements arrive from a BGP data aggre-
gator. The application validates each announcement with a query to the reverse DNS as outlined in
Algorithm 2. This algorithm classifies route route announcements into one of the following three
categories:
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(1) VALID: a DNSSEC-validated SRO RRSET was received and one of the route origins in
the RRSET matches the origin contained in the BGP route announcement.
(2) INVALID: a route hijack was detected because either 1) the DNSSEC-validated SRO re-
sponses received did NOT match the origin of the route announcement (e.g. an origin
hijack) or 2) there was no SRO record at the domain name corresponding to this prefix,
but the authoritative zone did contain an RLOCK statement (e.g. a sub-prefix hijack).
(3) NOTFOUND: there was no SRO record for this prefix and no RLOCK record to protect
the zone, or the data did not properly validate with DNSSEC. In this case, the algorithm
cannot authoritatively state that the prefix is valid or invalid, so it is simply marked as not
found.
The actual DNS query process is simple. Upon receiving a route announcement, ROVER
converts the prefix into a DNS name (as discussed above) and issues a query for the SRO records
at that name. If DNSSEC authenticated SRO records are returned, the route is classified as either
VALID if the origin ASN is authorized or INVALID if the origin does not match.
If no records are returned (NXDOMAIN or NOERROR with number of answers=0), the au-
thority section of the DNS response identifies the covering zone. ROVER then performs a query
to that domain name (the zone apex) for an RLOCK record. If an RLOCK is returned, the zone
owner has deployed ROVER. The DNSSEC authenticated denial of existence for the SRO proves
the zone owner did not authorize route announcements for the prefix. This is a sub-prefix hijack
and the prefix is marked as INVALID. If no RLOCK exists, the zone owner has not deployed
ROVER and the prefix is marked as NOTFOUND.
This verification algorithm is “fail-safe”. If a query for a DNS record fails, or if DNSSEC fails
to validate the record, the algorithm behave as if no DNS records were present in the first place.
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Algorithm 2 The ROVER prefix validation algorithm. This function compares the announced
BGP origin with authoritative data retrieved from the reverse DNS and returns VALID, BOGUS
or UNKNOWN. Origin and sub-prefix hijacks are both detected.
function VALIDATE( prefix, origin)
DNSname← convertToReverseDNS(prefix) // convert to DNS name
response, rc, f lags← doDNSquery(DNSname, SRO) // query the DNS
if rc = TIMEOUT then return UNKNOWN // no response
if not ADbit in flags then return UNKNOWN // response didn’t have DNSSEC
if rc = NOERROR and length(response) 6= 0 then // got non-empty response?
for all RRset in response do
if RRsettype = SRO then // loop through SROs received
for all RRData in RRset do
if origin = RRdataorigin then return VALID // Origin is Valid!
return BOGUS // Origin Hijack! None of the SROs matched
if rc = NXDOMAIN or rc = NOERROR then // No SROs. Check for RLOCK.
DNSname = responseauthoritySection // find zone apex
if DNSname = in-addr.arpa, etc. then return UNKNOWN // don’t search too far
response, rc, f lags← doDNSquery(DNSname,RLOCK) // query the DNS
if rc = TIMEOUT then return UNKNOWN // no response
if not ADbit in flags then return UNKNOWN // response didn’t have DNSSEC
if rc = NOERROR and length(response) 6= 0 then return BOGUS
// RLOCK exists. Sub-prefix hijack detected.
return UNKNOWN // no SRO, no RLOCK found. Zone opt-out.
else return UNKNOWN // SERVFAIL, DNSSEC didn’t validate, FORMERR, etc.
This results in marking a BGP announcement as NOTFOUND. A successful DNSSEC-downgrade
attack would result in classifying records as NOTFOUND. However the redundancy in DNS would
allow checking of multiple slave DNS servers should DNSSEC fail to validate.
3.5. Example Application: The ROVER Testbed
A web-accessible testbed, rover.secure64.com [9], has been built as a both a proof-of-
concept and as a platform for experiments with origin validation.
After creating an account on the testbed web site, a user can experiment with several different
functional areas. The user can define and publish a zone file containing SRO and RLOCK records,
perform a ROVER route verification, or view a live IP hijack monitor which examines real-time
data from BGPmon. In this section we will only discuss the publisher and hijack monitor.
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Figure 3.3. Secure64 ROVER Testbed showing the provisioning system. Historical
routes are displayed for a prefix and the user may choose to accept, reject or mod-
ify them. A zone file containing the appropriate RLOCK and SRO records is then
automatically generated.
3.5.1. Zone Provisioning. ROVER data is normally published in reverse DNS zones. Several
organizations have already done so. Although simply adding names and records will not break
existing DNS deployments, most organizations have policies and provisioning systems for manag-
ing the DNS. Obtaining authorization to add records to the DNS may be non-trivial and updating
provisioning systems can be time consuming. We do not expect that typical operators will invest
time in understanding how to convert an IP prefix into the DNS name, nor how to generate the
SRO and RLOCK statements. Scripts, tools, services, and documents are all needed. As a lower
barrier to entry, the ROVER testbed provides a provisioning system and a shadow zone in which
one can experiment.
The provisioning tool automatically detects existing BGP announcements used by an ISP and
converts them into a ROVER zone file. The program retrieves WHOIS data, looks at a history data
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base to show previously seen BGP announcements related to that net block, and uses the CAIDA
AS-inference table to present the transit providers associated with each origin. The operator can
accept the suggested route announcements as is, delete some, add others, and then generate zone
file contents by a simple button push. A sample screen shot of the provisioning system is illustrated
in figure 3.3
We collaborated with both large and small ISPs in constructing the provisioning tool. Operators
were able to provision zones on their own. The provisioning tool is useful for small ISPs and
has been used by large ISPs to provision a portion of their addresses. It is impractical for large
organizations with hundreds or thousands of net blocks. We foresee the need for additional tools
that can generate ROVER zones from reading router configuration files or obtaining data from
other information sources owned by the ISP. Several operators who were completely unknown to
us were also able to provision zones with no assistance or information other than what was present
on the web site. These zones just “showed up” as various ISPs in Europe, America and Australia
heard about ROVER and signed up on the web site to try their own experiments.
3.5.2. IP Hijack Monitor. Once data has been provisioned, ROVER uses a real-time BGP feed
provided by RouteViews/BGPmon [48]. As the RouteViews peer announces a route change, the
change is propagated to ROVER in real-time. ROVER receives data from roughly 40 peers; the
number varies slightly as the real-time feed is being expanded by the RouteViews and BGPmon
teams. ROVER classifies each update as VALID, INVALID, or NOTFOUND as described in the
previous section.
Figure 3.4 shows a screen capture from the ROVER Verification interface. The speedometer on
the right shows the rate of incoming BGP data messages from the RouteViews peers. Every prefix
is checked against three distinct data sources. First, ROVER queries the existing reverse DNS.
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Figure 3.4. Secure64 Testbed showing ROVER & History Attack Detection
As the Figure shows, only a small number of prefixes currently have data entered in the existing
reverse DNS. Second, Rover queries the shadow reverse DNS hosted at at the ROVER site. Finally,
ROVER keeps a historical log of all BGP updates and compares each update against the historical
record. The table at the bottom of Figure 3.4 show each potential hijack that was detected.
By clicking on the event, a user can determine which BGP routers have observed the event and
exam other details such as the actual BGP updates associated with the event. Figure 3.5 shows
the detailed view of one event. The map indicates the geographic location of BGP routers who
observed the potential hijack. One can click on the BGP peer router or the row to show the actual
BGP updates associated with the event.
To provide ground truth, we worked with a tier-1 ISP to both publish data and announce an
intentionally invalid route. The ISP published their DNSSEC-signed reverse-DNS. The ISP an-
nounced a sub-prefix hijack at a time chosen at random. This single BGP announcement was one
of a multitude of announcements that the ROVER testbed analyzed on a continuous basis. The
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Figure 3.5. Rover Event showing geographical detectors
hijack was successfully detected in less than a minute and observed to propagate across the world
in a span of five minutes.
The results also shows the advantage of using multiple vantage points. BGPMon collects
route announcements from multiple world-wide BGP peers. Multiple vantage points can expose a
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localized or stealthy IP hijack. The testbed hijack detector displays a world-wide map indicating
which collectors have encountered the hijack, and which are operating normally. This is very useful
to an E-commerce or other organization which may think that everything is operating perfectly, but
is blissfully unaware that no one in Europe or other parts of the world can reach their IP block.
64
CHAPTER 4
GLOBAL INTERNET CHARACTERISTICS AND MEASUREMENTS
With ROVER defined, we now proceed to the research questions outlined in the introduction
to this dissertation: how well does ROVER work? How many organizations have to deploy it in
order for it to be effective at detecting or preventing hijacks? What are its issues and limits?
We perform this analysis in the next four chapters. To set the stage, this chapter describes
baseline metrics of the Internet topology that are relevant to IP hijack propagation. Chapter 5
gives an analysis of IP hijack propagation in the absence of any defenses. Chapter 6 examines
the effectiveness of ROVER within an incremental deployment model. Finally, Chapter 7 probes
the vulnerabilities and dependencies of ROVER. We examine its resilience in the face of threat or
component failure, and measure the load it poses on the global DNS system.
In this chapter we discuss measurements and characteristics of the global Internet. Section 4.1
describes the simulation program developed to perform measurements and experiments. Section
4.2 discusses the accuracy of the model with respect to the real-world Internet. Finally, Section
4.3 explores baseline metrics for the simulated topology We introduce two new metrics, depth and
reach, that will be seen to correlate well with the success or failure of an IP hijack attempt.
4.1. A Simulation Model of the Global Internet
The Global Internet simulator is a small object-oriented Python program that performs BGP
announcements and attacks within a model reflecting the structure of the real Internet. This pro-
gram was developed to meet the specific needs of this thesis. Other available simulation programs
were examined for use but were found to be unsuitable. Those simulator programs focused on
message passing between two routers and verification of the BGP protocol itself. We needed a
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program that would quickly propagate BGP announcements and manage the relationships among
tens of thousands of routers. The end result was a program that could fully propagate an announce-
ment throughout the simulated topology within 2 seconds on an x86 based computer. Even this
was slow when a test run had to loop through thousands of announcements and attacks. Several
of the graphs in Chapter 6, for example, took 24 hours of computation for just one line. 7 days of
computation were required to plot one graph.
On startup the simulator constructs a topology of 42,697 interconnected router objects as
it reads a list of 139,156 relationships. These relationships define whether a neighboring AS
is a provider, peer, customer or sibling. The relationship table was obtained from CAIDA file
20121101.as-rel.txt [6].
The simulator program is complemented with a SQLITE3 database containing useful informa-
tion about each individual autonomous system. This supplemental database (see Figure 4.1) lists
the AS number, name, degree of connectedness, number of IP addresses owned by the AS, geoloca-
tion information, and organizational owner. The ASINFO table was constructed in multiple passes
by combining various data sources including routing tables from Oregon ROUTEVIEWS [38],
the CAIDA relationship table, CAIDA organization table (as org2info.20120411.txt, a
work-in-progress by CAIDA’s Bradley Huffaker), and geolocation data downloaded from max-
mind.com [30].
Each router object (Figure 4.1) contains its own local state information:
• inter-connection tables for peers, customers, transit providers and siblings
• AS name and geolocation data
• a RIB table to store prefix announcements, AS paths, and LOCAL PREF used
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Figure 4.1. Simulator Object Model and Data Base
Each router object has a set of methods to perform housekeeping tasks, but more importantly,
to make and to receive prefix announcements with its neighbors. Each router object follows a strict
policy for these methods to ensure “best path acceptance” and “valley-free routing” are enabled.
PREFIX ACCEPTANCE POLICY: A router will accept an announcement and place it into
its RIB based on LOCAL PREF and shortest path. LOCAL PREF is set such that customers
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are preferred over peers, and peers are preferred over transit providers. If a router already has
an announcement in its RIB and a new announcement arrives with equal LOCAL PREF, then
the new announcement is accepted only if has a shorter path length than the previously accepted
announcement.
PROPAGATION POLICY: Egress filters are used that enforce valley-free routing policy. Most
ISPs, but not all, follow valley-free routing rules:
• customer to provider: export all prefixes except those of its providers and peers
• provider to customer: export all routes
• peer to peer: export customer and sibling only
• sibling to sibling: uses a community string to create the equivalent of one AS out of
multiple sibling ASes, then propagates messages according to the rules above.
The simulation is capable of propagating announcements and attacks among the inter-connected
routers and writes relevant statistics into the database. Results can then be visualized with graph-
ics and tables. Some of the graphic programs developed were inspired by the CAIDA website of
internet topology visualizations [7]. These visualizations are useful for gaining insights on attack
propagation, especially when comparing before and after scenarios to see the effect or ROVER and
how attacks might still propagate despite defensive measures.
The polar graph in Figure 4.2 shows a visualization of the 42,696 ASes contained in the simu-
lated topology.
• Longitude of any AS is plotted along the circular perimeter. One can clearly see AS
densities in Europe, Asia and the Americas, with corresponding sparseness in ocean areas.
• Radius from the center determines the degree of connectivity of an AS based on a loga-
rithmic scale. The closer to the center the higher the number of interconnections. Tier1
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Figure 4.2. Polar graph of Network Topology
ASes appear in the middle. Cogent, for example, has 3738 interconnected ASes. The fur-
ther out towards the perimeter, the smaller the degree of AS interconnections. The outer
perimeter ASes have only 1 or 2 interconnections.
• Finally, the diameter of each circle gives an indication of the total size of the address space
assigned to each AS. Large address space is owned by ASes such as China Telecomm,
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enter a command: announce 25883
AS 25883 announcing 25883
generation 0: number of messages=3
generation 1: number of messages=5287
generation 2: number of messages=44286
generation 3: number of messages=30394
generation 4: number of messages=4410
generation 5: number of messages=349
generation 6: number of messages=2
announcement complete; propagated to 42320 ASes
Figure 4.3. Simulator output from announce 25883 command
the United States Department of Defense, Cogent, Level3, Sprint, HP, Apple, etc.
The simulator also has a command language interpreter (CLI). After startup the operator can
issues commands such as “announce 12145” to initiate a BGP announcement that will prop-
agate throughout the topology. The command “attack 6582 12145” will cause AS6582 to
perform an IP hijack against AS12145. Other commands exist to flush the RIB tables, find longest
or nonexistent paths, display summary statistics for the topology, and to print the state of any
particular RIB. For example, the output from “announce 25883” is shown in Figure 4.3.
This example illustrates an important point: BGP messages are propagated to neighboring
routers one generation at a time, just like the real internet. A router will examine all the messages
it has received during one generation and then propagate the best choice to its neighbors at the next
generation of announcements. Propagation stops when there are no messages left to send.
The simulator has useful commands to display statistics and the current state of any particular
AS in the topology. Figure 4.4 shows the print command for the Colorado State University AS
(12145) after it has received the announcement from 25883. Note the use of arrows in the RIB
relationship line. These indicate a customer-to-provider or provider-to-customer relationship. The
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enter a command: print 12145
ASN 12145: Colorado State University
Address Space: 66560 IPv4 addresses
Degree: 5
latitude: 40.088 longitude: -105.374
providers: 1299, 14041




25883: pref=100 Path:[14041, 3356, 25883]
Relationships: 12145 --> 14041 --> 3356 <-- 25883
12145: COLORADOSTATEUNIV - Colorado State University
14041: University Corp for Atmospheric Research
3356: LEVEL3 Level 3 Communications
25883: CITIGROUP - Citigroup
Figure 4.4. Simulator output from print 12145 command
tip of the arrow points to the provider. This styling enables one to see that there there is always a
customer to provider to customer chain, and that no valleys exist. Other symbols are used for tier-1
to tier-1 relationships, peer-to-peer relationships, and sibling-to-sibling relationships.
We now give an example showing how simulation results can be used to generate a series of
graphics or animated movies that visually display an attack.
The polar graphs in Figure 4.5 illustrate a sequence of BGP announcements in which AS6582
(Front Range Internet based in Fort Collins, CO) is hijacking the IP Prefix of AS25883 (Citigroup,
chosen simply because it is an attractive hijack target – a bank).
The attack begins with AS6852 sending the prefix to its 15 BGP neighbors. Some of the
neighbors reject the announcement (lines shown in green) because of policy. Their existing paths
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Figure 4.5. AS6582 (FRII) hijacking AS25883 (CitiGroup)
may be shorter or may have a higher LOCAL PREF. Twelve of the neighbors accept the “better
path” however (line shown in red). In particular, a tier-1 transit provider, Cogent, has accepted the
announcement.
The second generation begins after a nominal 30 second router timeout. A veritable hailstorm
of announcements is sent out from several radius points. Most of the lines are red, causing further
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Figure 4.6. Hilbert Graph; red areas cannot reach AS25883
AS pollution. 3898 routers are polluted at the end of this step; 21% of the internet address space
can no longer reach Citigroup.
The third generation continues, but in this case most of the announcements are rejected. The
paths are starting to get long. Nevertheless we now have more than 7000 ASes polluted and 28%
of the address space cannot reach Citigroup.
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This continues until BGP convergence is reached in the 8th generation (about 4 minutes). In the
end, 9328 ASes are polluted and 42% of the internet address space cannot reach Citigroup. This
graphic visualization shows both large and small ASes have been impacted, distributed worldwide.
Visualization can also be used to illustrate the extent of an attack. The graph shown in Figure
4.6 shows a map of the entire IPv4 address space organized into blocks following a Hilbert path
through 2D space. Each of the 256 /8 address blocks are clearly defined and smaller spaces exist
as fractals within each of these blocks. Green blocks are untouched by the IP hijack and can still
reach Citigroup. Red blocks are polluted and will be routed to the attacker instead of the proper
destination. These red blocks can be seen to be distributed across both large and small IP address
blocks.
4.2. Simulation Accuracy
A natural concern with any research based on simulation is whether the experimental results
obtained are an accurate reflection of what would happen in the real Global Internet.
Other papers, notably [25] and [16] reference experimental results obtained from simulators
that are similar to ours. In [16], the authors caution that “Because we work within a model of
routing policies, we caution against interpreting our results as hard numbers that measure the
impact of an attack launched by a specic manipulator in practice. However, the trends uncovered
by our quantitative analysis do allow us to arrive at a number of useful insights.”.
Complete accuracy is not a practical goal, nor is it necessarily needed. The BGPSIM system
developed by NLNetLabs [34] was designed to balance tradeoffs between scalability, CPU effi-
ciency, extensibility and accuracy. The authors state “ For global operation and stability of BGP,
it is questionable whether an “exact” model of the AS topology is needed. An interesting direction
of research might be to identify classes of similar topology for which results are generalizable.” In
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Table 4.1. Comparison of Five Simulation Runs to RIB Entries from Oregon RouteViews
deterministic deterministic random-10 random-2 random-2
with tier-1 with tier-1 with tier-1 with tier-1 with tier-1
valley-free shortest path valley-free valley-free shortest-path
# routes 1,186,568 1,186,568 1,186,568 1,186,568 1,186,568
match 425,501 473,275 246,624 282,806 372,392
all but 1 248,752 278,330 168,383 196,024 250,100
total ok 674,253 751,605 415,007 478,830 622,492
percent ok 56.8% 63.3% 35.0% 40.4% 52.5%
that spirit, my simulations could have been run on a completely synthetic topology and yet would
still generate significant learnings. Furthermore, the real internet’s AS topology evolves daily so
that results start to become less accurate over time.
Nevertheless, one would want the simulation to at have a as strong a correspondence as pos-
sible to the actual Internet so that real-world comparisons could be made. To that end, a series of
modifications were made to the simulation engine and measured for accuracy. Most of these mod-
ifications involved changes to the internet topology (AS relation table), BGP policy enforcement,
and use of Monte-Carlo randomness techniques.
The various modified topologies were compared path-by-path with over 1 million routes taken
from the Oregon RouteViews (file rib.ASCII.20130111). Simulated paths that either matched
the RIB data identically or that had a matching path length with only one AS substitution were
considered to be accurate. In the latter case the paths were considered accurate because they were
topologically equivalent, for example, substituting provider 1 with provider 2.
The end result, illustrated in table 4.1 showed accuracy ranging from a minimum of 35% to a
best-case of 63.3%. This best-case simulator was then used for all attack and defense experiments.
The five variants listed in each column of table 4.1 have the following characteristics and
differences:
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• Deterministic Tier-1 valley-free and Deterministic Tier-1 shortest-path: These two
columns have the best accuracy. Paths are selected deterministically, as described by
the PREFIX ACCEPTANCE RULES in Section 4.1. The difference between these two
models is the treatment of Tier-1 ASes: in one case we strictly follow the valley-free rule
at the detriment of path length. In the second case a Tier-1 AS will ignore the valley-
free rule if a shorter path is presented to it. This shortest-path rule improved accuracy
from 56.8% to 63.3%. Here is an example of a Tier-1 using the valley-free rule in which
AS2914 selects a path from customer AS5580 because it has a higher LOCAL PREF than
the path from a Tier-1 peer:
Path:[5580, 16128, 6]
Relationships: 2914 <-- 5580 <-- 16128 <-- 6
2914: NTT-COMMUNICATIONS
5580: ATRATO Atrato IP Networks
16128: AGARIK-BULLPI-NETWORK AGARIK
6: BULL-NETWORK
Compare this to the case following the Tier-1 shortest-path rule:
Path:[209, 6]




Thousands of similar paths were shortened using this rule, resulting in overall improved
accuracy.
76
• Monte-Carlo Experiments The latter three columns were an attempt to see if adding
randomization to path selection would improve accuracy. Surprisingly, the end results
were worse, but can be explained logically.
An AS can have hundreds of connections to other ASes. The simulation algorithm sets
LOCAL PREF to 300 for all customer connections, 200 for all peers, and 100 for all
providers. Once a path is placed is in the RIB it will not be replaced until an announce-
ment with a higher LOCAL PREF or an announcement with an equal LOCAL PREF but
shorter path length is received. This creates the deterministic model described earlier.
The first set of Monte-Carlo experiments were run in which the LOCAL PREF assign to
an AS was randomized. As table 4.1 indicates, accuracy dropped from 63.3% to as little
as 35%. This is because LOCAL PREF trumps SHORTEST PATH. Take the case of a
peer connection. If LOCAL PREF is randomly spread from 200 to 201, or more widely
from 200 to 210, the algorithm will choose the highest LOCAL PREF even if it already
has a peer with a shorter path. This caused paths to lengthen in thousands of cases. The
end result was a loss of accuracy.
To avoid this situation, a different set of Monte-Carlo experiments were then performed.
In these experiments the path selection algorithm randomly chose to keep or replace an ex-
isting path with an announcement that had identical length and preference. The end result
had very similar accuracy, 63.0%, to the deterministic case, 63.3%. The only noticeable
difference was that IP hijack simulations had very small variance in the number of pol-
luted ASes. An attack from AS6582 to AS25883, for example, polluted 8139 ASes in the
deterministic case. In the Monte-Carlo case, this number varied by only plus-or-minus
11. This was too small an effect to justify the extra computation time and simulation
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complexity. Consequently, it was decided to continue the research experiments with the
deterministic algorithm rather than a randomized one.
Several other items also affect simulation accuracy. CAIDA’s AS relationship table is known to
be reasonably accurate, but not perfect. Several AS numbers are missing. There are 70 stub ASes
that have only a peer connection, but do not have a provider. Sibling relationships are not listed in
the table and are instead presented as peers. This caused some connectivity problems. Surprisingly,
Stanford University showed limited connectivity because it is isolated by a peer that should be a
sibling. Many Department of Defense ASes had similar problems. Therefore I converted 387 peers
to siblings to improve accuracy.
Private peers are not contained in the AS relationship table because they are not visible to most
routers. Furthermore, some Internet Exchange (IX) route-servers are also not listed in the table.
Instead, a direct peer-to-peer relationship is listed between members of the IX. These IX route
servers will not show up in the simulation; for reference they are listed in table 4.2. Fortunately
these situations with private peers and IX route servers do not affect most of the research on attack
and defense. This is due to the fact that peering creates isolated islands that do not propagate
announcements.
In any event, the simulation model is designed to be basically simple and reasonably accurate
without adding undue complexity. It cannot reflect the individual policy maintained by each router
in each AS as most of these are not known. Instead, the simulator uses the valley-free rule as
its generic propagation policy. Egress filters that prevent improper BGP announcements from
propagating are not initially enabled; egress filters will be applied when we discuss attacks and
defenses. Furthermore, the simulation does not account for policy unique to each geographically
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Table 4.2. Internet Exchange List
ASN Internet Exchange Name
1200 AMS-IX1
4635 HKIX-RS1
5507 Budapest Internet Exchange
6695 DECIX-AS
7606 Western Australia Internet Exchange (WAIX)
8714 London Internet Exchange
9355 Nat’l Institute of Information & Communication Technology
9560 Auckland Peering Exchange (APE)





18398 PIPE Networks Sydney Internet Exchange
21371 EQUINIX-UK-ASN




40633 Los Angeles Internet Exchange
42476 Swiss Internet Exchange SwissIX
43100 Lyonix
47886 EQUINIX-NL-ASN
48850 KIX - KIKE Internet eXchange
55818 MC-IX
diverse POP that an AS manages. It does not inflate paths by repeating AS numbers. It does not
dynamically announce and withdraw paths to perform traffic management.
There is ongoing research to improve AS relationship inference. A very recent Infocom paper
by Neudorfer et al [33] describes improvements using Point-of-Presence (PoP) information. (Co-
incidentally, this paper also noticed the Stanford anomaly that I had discovered.) But perfection is
not the goal. Despite its limitations, the simulation model is reasonably accurate and it provides an
extremely useful tool for studying complex BGP interactions.
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As one final sanity check, I tried duplicating a real world IP Hijack attack with the simulator.
ArsTechnica and several blogs [39] had reported an event on November 5, 2012. An Indonesian
ISP, Moratel, inadvertently hijacked Google for 30 minutes by announcing the Google address
space. Only a small percent of the internet was affected, but the report indicated that the CloudFlare
AS was affected. My simulation reported that 9% of the internet address space was affected,
and the simulated AS for CloudFlare was impacted as well. Although this experiment is more
descriptive than analytical, it still bolstered confidence in the simulation accuracy.
4.3. System Measurements
The AS system topology is the stage upon which all BGP announcements, attacks and defenses
are performed. This section provides basic measurements such as size and connectivity to help in
understanding BGP behavior. We also introduce several new metrics, topological depth distribu-
tion, tier-1 reach and tier-1 overlap that correlate with attack propagation. The usefulness of these
new metrics will be seen in subsequent chapters.
Table 4.3 presents basic measurements regarding the size of the AS topology. There are a total
of 42,697 ASes in the system. From top to bottom of the hierarchy, these consist of:
• tier-1: 17 of the ASes qualify as tier-1 ASes. These nodes are fully interconnected; that is,
each tier-1 AS is directly connected to all other tier-1 ASes. By definition, a tier-1 AS has
no provider relationships; their role is to provide transit for their peers and customers. The
largest tier-1 AS is Cogent, with 3,738 connections to neighboring peers and customers.
The smallest is France Telecom, with 142 neighbors. A list of tier-1 ASes is provided in
table 4.4.
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Table 4.3. Topology Characteristics
Category Count
Total number of ASes in network 42,697
Tier 1 Transit ASes 17
Non-Tier1 Transit ASes 6,301
Stub ASes 36,379
Stub ASes connected to a Tier-1 10,725
Stub ASes singly-homed to Tier 1 ASes 2,418
Transit ASes homed to Tier 1 ASes only 3,080
Highest degree of inter-connections 3,738
Maximum Distance from a tier-1 AS 7
• Transit: 6,301 (14.7%) transit ASes exist at one or more levels below the tier-1 ASes.
A Transit AS can have zero or more providers, peers, customers and siblings. Approxi-
mately half (3,080) of the Transit ASes are directly connected to a tier-1 AS. The remain-
der are lower in the hierarchy and connect to a higher-level transit-AS.
• Stub: 36,370 (85%) of the ASes are stubs; that is, they have no customers and are con-
nected to providers, peers or siblings only. Of these, 10,725 stubs are directly connected
to a tier-1 AS, and 2,418 of these are singly-homed. The maximum distance from a tier-1
AS to a Stub AS is 7 hops.
The next set of measurements addresses inter-connectivity among the ASes. Figure 4.7 charts
the distribution of ASes with respect to degree (the total number of neighbors connected to an AS),
and then further decomposes this into provider, customer and peer distributions. The data show
that an AS may have as few as 1 neighbor and as many as 3738. As is evident from the chart,
however, about 80% of the ASes are connected to just 3 or fewer neighbors. Classifying these
connections we observe:
• provider: about 80% of the ASes have 0-2 providers, with the maximum at 37.
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Figure 4.7. Base Metrics: distribution of degree, providers, peers and customers
82
Figure 4.8. Depth distribution
• customer: Most of the ASes are stubs; 36,379 of the ASes have no customer links. Of
the remaining 6,318 ASes, 80% have 10 or fewer customers and 99.7% have fewer than
100 customers. The largest number is 3,659.
• peer: 36,776 of the ASes have no peer relationships. The remaining 5,921 ASes have
a slightly broader distribution of peers; 72% have fewer than 10 peers. The maximum
is 2,029. It should be noted that internet exchange points are centers of connectivity
in which hundreds of ASes can peer with each other. Examples include Equinix with
768 members, DE-CIX (Deutscher Commercial Internet Exchange) with 480+ members,
PARIX (Paris Exchange) with 40+ members, and dozens more.
Next, we define several new metrics that play prominently in the success or failure of attack
propagation, depth, tier-1 reach, and tier-1 overlap.
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Depth is defined as the distance from an AS to its nearest tier-1 AS. By definition, this number
will be 0 for a tier-1 AS, and infinite if there is no path from an AS to any tier-1 AS. The maximum
depth is seven, however 99% of ASes have a depth less than or equal to three as illustrated in
Figure 4.8. Depth is important because it relates to BGP path length. As described in Chapter
2, BGP path length is a major factor in accepting or rejecting a route. An attacker can be more
successful if its depth is low resulting in shorter attack path lengths. Conversely, a target becomes
more vulnerable with higher depth because of the increase in path length.
Tier-1 Reach is defined the total number of ASes that a tier-1 BGP announcement will reach if
all other tier-1 ASes are disabled. This gives a measure of BGP propagation as well as a measure
of independence and overlap among the various tier-1 ASes. Reach ranges from a minimum of
21,468 to a maximum of 42,321. Table 4.4 lists the seventeen tier-1 ASes and provides several
metrics including reach and degree.
Unlike other metrics such as AS degree, it should be noted that Tier-1 reach is not a measure-
ment that can be simply calculated or looked up. AS reach can only be derived through simulations
that propagate announcements through a topological model.
It is interesting to note that there is little correlation between the degree of a tier-1 AS and its
corresponding reach. For example, ATT has a relatively large degree of 2430 and can propagate
an announcement to 21,297 ASes. On the other hand, France Telecom has a very small degree of
142, yet it can reach 21,468 other ASes, slightly more than ATT. How can this be explained?
An examination of the simulation results announcing ATT and France Telecom shows that,
as expected, the first generation of BGP announcements propagates to 2430 and 142 ASes re-
spectively. However the second through ninth generations continue the propagation and it is the
AS-connectivity among these levels that determines the final outcome.
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Table 4.4. Tier-1 AS List
ASN Name Degree Peers Customers Reach Reach2 Overlap
174 Cogent 3738 80 3,658 32,172 35,980 89%
3356 Level3 3524 56 3468 35,477 37,006 96%
7018 ATT 2430 31 2399 21,297 33,378 64%
3549 GBLX 2376 433 1943 35,736 36,828 97%
701 UUNET 1765 44 1721 23,143 32,801 71%
209 Qwest 1433 54 1379 28,460 33,488 85%
2828 XO 1173 151 1022 29,500 33,798 87%
6461 Metromedia 1067 166 901 32,040 34,600 93%
3257 TINET 968 59 909 32,369 35,065 92%
1239 Sprint 929 35 894 27,520 33,048 83%
2914 NTT 882 78 804 31,732 34,637 92%
1299 TeliaNet 800 41 759 32,969 35,438 93%
6453 TATA 712 109 603 34,619 35,890 96%
3320 DTAG 547 70 477 24,848 32,278 77%
3561 Savvis 386 41 345 34,856 35,929 97%
6762 Seabone 304 60 244 28,004 33,177 84%
5511 France T’com 142 33 109 21,468 31,435 68%
Figure 4.9. Tier-1 Reach (sorted with respect to degree)
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Figure 4.10. Scattergrams: Tier-1 Reach vs Degree (correlation=0.20) and Tier-1
Reach vs Next-Level-Customer-Count (correlation=0.72)
The scattergrams in Figure 4.10 were created in an effort to corroborate the results seen during
the simulation. The first graph shows reach vs degree and indicates a very low correlation of
0.20. (A correlation greater than 0.8 is generally described as strong, and anything less than 0.5
is considered weak.) The second scattergram shows reach vs sum of 1st level customer count and
shows a better correlation of 0.72. Accordingly, it is shown that each tier-1 AS can propagate quite
differently from other tier-1 ASes based not on degree but on the underlying mesh of connectivity.
The reach metrics can also be used to measure the relative independence of each tier-1 AS. For
example, how much overlap is there between announcements sent from ATT and from Level3?
Likewise, how independent are they?
To answer this, Figure 4.11 shows 4 of the 17 possible charts when announcements are made
from pairs of Tier-1 ASes.
France Telecom is shown to have a small reach of 21,468 on its own. When combined with any
other Tier-1 AS, their combined reach is extended to various higher levels, averaging to 31,435.
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Figure 4.11. Four set of Tier-1 overlap measurements (red bar = average)
The overlap metric is calculated as dualReach / standaloneReach. France Telecom’s overlap met-
ric calculates to 68%. In other words, France Telecom has a comparatively low overlap with other
Tier-1 ASes.
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On the other hand, Global Crossing has a large standalone reach of 35,736. When combined
with another Tier-1 AS the average reach only extends a small amount to 36,828. The overlap
metric in this case is 97%; that is, Global Crossing greatly overlaps with the other Tier-1 ASes.
Figure 4.12 summarizes all of the Tier-1 ASes listing individual reach and average overlapping
reach. This table of overlap metrics gives an indication of BGP behavior when an AS is multi-
homed with two or more Tier-1 providers.
Now that we have a set of basic metrics, we can proceed with an analysis of IP hijack propa-
gation. This will be discussed in the next chapter.
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Figure 4.12. Tier-1 reach and overlap
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CHAPTER 5
ANALYSIS OF IP HIJACK PROPAGATION
Before we can analyze the effectiveness of ROVER, we must first understand how IP hijacks
propagate in the absence of any filters or blocking devices. This provides a baseline for compar-
isons when we do apply defensive measures.
We define a target AS as vulnerable if a large number of other ASes are polluted with a bogus
path when an attacking AS makes an announcement hijacking the target’s address space. Con-
versely, a target is resistant when relatively fewer ASes are polluted. Likewise, an attacker is
considered to be aggressive if it can pollute many ASes compared to the average case.
Attack propagation can vary immensely. Sub-prefix attacks are the most aggressive. Since they
have no competing path to overcome, sub-prefix attacks are able to propagate across and pollute
the entire Internet. In contrast, origin attacks can be either strong or weak. Some ASes are more or
less vulnerable to attack than others. Some ASes are more or less aggressive as an attacker. When
an origin attack does occur, it could end up polluting just a portion of the Internet, or spread very
widely.
In this chapter we examine these variations in attack propagation and analyze reasons for the
different behavior. Section 5.1 demonstrates attack variance with two illustrative examples. Sec-
tions 5.2 and 5.3 gives an analysis of the topological factors that affect the extent of an attack
propagation. Section 5.4 then gives a brief overview of the changing Internet topology with re-
spect to private peering and Internet Exchanges and how this may affect attack propagation.
90
5.1. Attack Variance
To illustrate attack variance, we will describe two origin hijacks that have very large differences
in their attack extent. The first example is a small attack in which an Indonesian ISP, Moratel, at
AS 23947 attacks Google at AS 15169. The second is a much larger attack in which ISI at AS 4
attacks Harvest Electronics NZ at AS23947. These attacks are depicted in figures 5.2 and 5.3.
Please note that we have slightly modified the format of these polar graphs (see Figure 5.1. The
new graphs are now constructed such that the depth2 metric for the AS is plotted along the radius
rather than degree. The Depth2 metric is similar to depth, but allows both Tier-1 and large Tier-2
backbone networks such as Time Warner Cable to also have a value of zero. The rationale for this
will be explained in Section 5.2.
Depth2 ranges from 0 to a maximum of 5, and one can see the number of ASes decreasing
in each band, as would be expected. The final circle in the middle is “infinity”, for the few ASes
for which no path exists from a Tier-1 or Tier-2 provider to the AS. This scheme creates seven
concentric circles, one for each value of depth, with highest depth in the center of the graph. This
new format makes it easier to see the communication between neighboring bands. AS degree is
still shown, but is now indicated by scattering within a concentric circle. Higher degree ASes are
towards the center. A sample of the new format polar graphs is shown in figure .
Figure 5.2 shows a sequence of events as Moratel hijacks Google’s address space. At the end
of the attack, only 3,416 of the total 42,697 ASes become polluted (18% of the internet address
space). Figure 5.3 shows ISI attacking Harvest Electornics New Zealand. In this case 40,950 ASes
become polluted (96% of the address space).
These two cases display a huge difference in behavior. In both cases we see the small number
of messages sent from the attacker to its neighbors in the first generation of announcements. The
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Figure 5.1. Polar graph of Network Topology where radius is now determined by depth
remaining three graphs in each sequence show subsequent generations of BGP message propaga-
tion. Red lines indicate a BGP announcement that is accepted by an AS, polluting its RIB with a
bogus path. Green lines indicate a BGP announcement that is rejected by the AS because it already
has an equal or better path than the one being received.
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Figure 5.2. A small attack: AS23947 (Moratel) hijacking AS15169 (Google)
In the Google example, most of the lines are green, and the attack doesn’t get very far. In the
Harvest Electronics case, however, the attack begins to succeed in the second generation and by
the third generation there is a veritable storm of bogus announcements being accepted as the attack
cascades into a major incident. The reason for the large difference in behaviors between the two
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Figure 5.3. A much larger attack: AS4 (ISI University of Southern California)
hijacking AS55857 (Harvest Electronics NZ)
attacks is related to the path lengths associated with each AS. This will be explained in Section
5.2.
Another experiment was conducted to examine variances. In this experiment, separate attacks
were launched from each and every AS against a single target, AS25883 (Citigroup). Even when
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Table 5.1. Variance in Attack Propagation for Individual ASes Attacking AS25883
(Citigroup)
Attack Extent Number of attacking ASes
(Polluted ASes Created) having this extent
0 580
1 to 10 246
10 to 100 571
100 to 1000 4646
1000 to 10000 35225
10000 to 42697 1429
the target AS remains the same, the extent of the damage varied widely depending on which AS
performed the attack (see table table 5.1).
5.2. Topological Factors Affecting Attack Propagation
Why is it that some attacks propagate widely while others are hardly noticeable? Is it possible
to predict, or at least give some general observations that quantify the extent of an attack?
This question was first examined by Ballani et al[1]. The Ballani paper, however, focused not
on quantification, but on the success or failure of an attack based on two variables, AS relationship
and path length. In this chapter we augment [1] by analyzing case studies in which the topological
locations of the attacker and the target are varied and measure the extent of each attack using the
simulator.
In general, predicting the extent of an attack can be very difficult. The topological path between
each AS in the system with respect to an attacker and a target can vary widely, causing large
divergence in the attack propagation. It is obviously impractical to consider each of the 1.8 billion
combinations of attackers and targets to build an exhaustive (and exhausting) quantification study.
Therefore the approach will be to search for patterns within the topology that exhibit a a statistical
consistency to their behavior. In the worst case, when no such pattern can be found, we can always
fall back to the simulator to get a numerical quantification of an attack extent.
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Figure 5.4. Simplified AS topology
Table 5.2. Summary of Average Attack Magnitudes; SH=singly homed,
MH=multiple-homed, δ specifies AS depth
∆depth Attacker Target Polluted ASes Average
-1 Stub, SH, δ1 Tier1, δ0 0 0
-1 Stub, SH, δ2 Stub, SH, δ1 1 - 40 9
0 Tier1, δ0 Tier1, δ0 513 - 19,032 6,040
0 Stub, SH, δ1 Stub, SH, δ1 513 - 19,032 6,040
0 Stub, SH, δ1 Stub, MH, δ1 0 - 15,594 3,714
0 Stub, MH, δ1 Stub, SH, δ1 2,691 - 25,059 10,187
0 Stub, MH, δ1 Stub, MH, δ1 544 - 21,235 7,286
0 Transit, δ1 Transit, δ1 1,249 - 17,864 6,467
0 Stub, SH, δ2 Stub, SH, δ2 1,249 - 17,864 6467
1 Tier1, δ0 Stub, SH, δ1 22,053 - 41,798 34,337
1 Tier1, δ0 Stub, MH, δ1 16,102 - 40,287 29,462
1 Stub, SH, δ1 Stub, SH, δ2 22,053 - 41,795 33,760
1 Transit, δ1 Stub, SH, δ2 22,746 - 41,798 34,241
2 Tier1, δ0 Stub, SH, δ2 30,486 - 41,913 40,016
To aid in this discussion, Figure 5.4 serves as a simplified topology guide. The Tier-1 ASes are
shown in blue, fully inter-connected with each other. Stub ASes (red) are shown at depth 1, and
at depth 2 and 3 as they connected through transit ASes (green). There are obviously other more
complicated situations, but this provides a starting guide. Later we will expand the discussion to
include major Tier-2 backbones, but for now we are examining Tier-1 centric networks.
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Table 5.3. Attack Magnitude as a Matrix
Target
Tier1 Stub, SH Stub, MH Transit Stub, SH





r Tier1, δ0 6,040 34,337 29,462 40,016
Stub, SH, δ1 0 6,040 3,714 33,760
Stub, MH, δ1 10,187 7,286
Transit, δ1 6,467 34,241
Stub, SH, δ2 9 6,467
Many experiments were conducted by attacking stub-to-stub, stub-to-Tier-1, etc. Results from
these experiments are shown in tables 5.2 and 5.3 and summarized in the following list:
(1) Factors affecting Attack Magnitude
• Define ∆depth = depthdefender − depthattacker
• ∆depth is the primary factor dictating the magnitude of an attack. An examination
of table 5.2 shows a marked increase in average AS pollution for each change in
∆depth.
• Sub-factors affecting attack magnitude are Tier-1 reach and Tier-1 overlap. The
range of min to max strongly correlates with Tier-1 reach.
• AS degree, although a well known metric, shows little correlation to attack mag-
nitude.
(2) Effect of Multi-homing and AS type
• Multi-homing makes an attacker more aggressive.
• Likewise, multi-homing makes a target less vulnerable.
• AS type (Tier1, stub, transit) appear to have little affect on attack magnitude,
although they obviously play a part in the policy decisions for attack propagation.
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(3) Attacker Aggressiveness Since ∆depth is the primary predictor, an aggressive attacker
should be a Tier-1 AS at depth 1. Multi-homing will increase aggressiveness. Carefully
selecting the provider ASes to have maximum AS reach and minimumAS overlap will
increase aggressiveness.
(4) Target Vulnerability The same factors listed above that make an attacker more aggressive
can also be used to make a target less vulnerable.
To understand the differences obtained in each experiment, recall the two primary factors used
by each AS to independently accept or reject an incoming announcement: LOCAL PREF and
PATH LENGTH.
• If a non-Tier-1 AS receives an announcement carrying a higher LOCAL PREF than is
currently stored in the RIB, it will accept the new announcement and propagate it to its
appropriate neighbors. (This does not apply to Tier-1 ASes which use PATH LENGTH
only).
• If an AS (both Tier-1 and non-Tier-1) has the same LOCAL PREF but a shorter PATH
LENGTH, the AS will accept the announcement and propagate it to its appropriate neigh-
bors, bogus or not.
• Otherwise the announcement is rejected.
A particular attack can be analyzed by looking at the topological location of each AS and
following the rules just listed: at each step, analyze whether the attack will propagate up (to
providers), down (to customers), and/or across (to peers and the customers of those peers. Each
AS must compare the path length to the attacker vs the existing path length to the target. If the
attacker has a shorter path length, the attack will be accepted and continue to propagate.
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5.2.1. Attacks at ∆depth = 0. In this section we examine the results when a Tier-1 AS attacks
another Tier-1 AS. The analysis and measurements are similar for other depth-n vs depth-n attacks,
although there will be intervening transit ASes involved that can result in slightly higher pollution.
A Tier-1 AS, due to its position in the core of the AS topology, is a very aggressive attacker.
The number of ASes polluted when one Tier-1 AS attacks another Tier-1 ranges from a minimum
of 513 (France Telecom attacking Global Crossing) to a maximum of 19,032 (Global Crossing
attacking France Telecom). The average value is 6,040.
This average number is fairly low, considering that Tier-1 ASes are strong attackers. Counter-
balancing this, however, is the fact that Tier-1 ASes are not very vulnerable as targets.
Tier-1 vs Tier-1 attacks are reasonably simple to analyze. An “attack” announcement cannot
propagate up since a Tier-1 has, by definition, no providers. Nor can the announcement propagate
across to other peer Tier-1 ASes. That attack announcement will have a path length of 1, which is
equal to the length of the pre-existing valid announcement, so it will be rejected. The only direction
in which the announcement can propagate is down to the attacking Tier-1 AS’s own customers.
Figures 5.5 illustrates the average number of ASes polluted for each Tier-1 AS acting as either
an attacker or as a defender. The ASes are sorted by AS degree and corresponding correlation
charts are also shown. Although AS degree is a well-known metric, AS degree fails to show a very
high correlation as a predictor of attack extent (r values = -0.34 and 0.69 respectively). In contrast
to this, the new AS reach metric introduced in the previous chapter actually shows a stronger
correlation of -0.88 for the target and approximately the same correlation for attacker.. Figure 5.6
presents the data sorted by AS reach along with associated correlation charts. A quick scan of these
charts reveals two outliers: Savvis and France Telecom. It is likely that the very low AS degree of
these two ASes dominates the AS reach metric, unlike the remaining ASes with moderate to high
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AS degree values. If these two outliers are removed from the chart, correlation increases to -0.94
(very strong correlation) and 0.76 (high-moderate correlation).
A hypothesis that multiplying AS degree with AS reach could be a better predictor of attack
extent was proposed, but the resulting correlation numbers did not support this experiment. Future
work could examine all 289 unique cases rather than the averages, and could also examine the
overlap factors. But for now, AS reach appears to be the major predictor quantifying attack extent.
The total polluted ASes is proportional to but less than AS reach due to the interference from
overlaps with other Tier-1 ASes.
Finally, we should note that other depth-n vs depth-n attacks do propagate BGP announcements
UP and back DOWN again. The intervening transit ASes may have descendants that become
polluted, which will increase the total aggregate pollution. This is observed in table 5.2.
5.2.2. Attacks at ∆depth = 1. We next examine what happens when a “blue” Tier-1 AS in
Figure 5.4 attacks a singly-homed “red” Stub AS directly connected to a Tier-1 AS. This is an
example of a ∆depth = 1 attack.
The number of ASes polluted in this type of attack ranges from a minimum of 22,053 (France
Telecom attacking any stub singly-homed to Level3) to a maximum of 41,798 (NTT attacking any
of its own stubs). Otherwise, the maximum for a Tier-1 attacking someone else’s stub was 40,982
(TINET attacking any stub of France Telecom). The average value is 34,377.
This average number is much higher than before, as ∆depth increases from 0 to 1.
Tier-1 vs Stub-1 attacks are also simple to analyze. As before, an “attack” announcement
cannot propagate up since a Tier-1 has, by definition, no providers. In this case, however, the
attack does propagate across to peers replacing the valid announcement with path length of 2 with
a new bogus announcement with a shorter path-length of 1. All of the tier-1’s except for the one
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Figure 5.5. Tier-1 Analysis with respect to degree; TARGET correlation=-0.34
(weak); ATTACKER correlation=0.69 (medium)
directly connected to the stub become polluted and participate in propagating the attack to their
descendants. With this many Tier-1 participants it is easy to see why we get the massive numbers
for the extent of the pollution.
In this scenario, it makes more sense to ignore the large number of polluted ASes and focus
instead on the much smaller number of non-polluted ASes. Why do they remain intact? The reason
is that there is only one non-polluted Tier-1 AS: the one connected to the stub itself. This Tier-1
will not pollute its descendants. However some of these descendants can be polluted if they happen
to overlap and have short enough connectivity to the other Tier-1 ASes. Consequently, the number
of non-polluted ASes will be less than or equal to the AS reach of that unpolluted Tier-1.
101
Figure 5.6. Tier-1 Analysis with respect to reach; TARGET correlation=-0.89
(strong); ATTACKER correlation=0.66 (medium). Removing Savvis and FT out-
liers increases correlation to -0.94 and 0.76 respectively.
Figure 5.7 shows the data correlates reasonably well with AS reach. Attacking Tier-1’s have
a positive correlation of 0 .77, and the defending stubs have a negative correlation of -0.88. The
value is negative because the higher the reach, the fewer the number of polluted ASes.
5.2.3. Attacks at ∆depth = 2. Deeper ASes become more difficult to analyze due to variances
in the intervening transit ASes. However we can expect ASes at deeper levels will be more vulner-
able as ∆depth increases.
Supporting this argument is the experimental data in which a Tier-1 attacks a Stub at depth 2.
In this case the average number of polluted ASes is 40,016. This is about 5,000 more than the
previous case at depth 1. The data is illustrated in Figure 5.8.
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Figure 5.7. Analysis of Tier1 attacking a Stub at depth 1 with respect to
reach; ATTACKER correlation=0.77 (high-medium); DEFENDER correlation=-
0.88 (strong)
Figure 5.8. Analysis of Tier1 attacking a Stub at depth 2 with respect to reach
At this point we are nearing the maximum number of ASes, and very little correlation is seen
between AS reach and the number of polluted ASes. It is now more fruitful to examine attacks
from lower levels.
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5.2.4. Negative ∆depth. A stub at depth 1 attacking a Tier 1 presents an extremely simple case
study. In short, all attacks fail to propagate because the attacker path length is always longer than
the original valid announcement.
Similar cases at lower depths can cause varying levels of pollution due to transit ASes receiving
an announcement and propagating the bogus announcement on to their customers.
5.3. Sequential Attack Analysis
So far we have examined variance in AS vulnerability based on statistical averages. We now
show experimental results regarding this variance based on a complete set of attacks from each
AS in the network. Measurements of vulnerability were performed by sequentially attacking a
target AS by each of the 42,696 other ASes and recording the number of polluted ASes. Results
are shown in figures 5.9 and 5.10. These graphs display the complementary cumulative sum of
compromised systems for each target AS. The curve for AS 98 in Figure 5.9, for example, shows
that attacks from 11,384 ASes create a minimum of 6000 polluted ASes, and that the count of
attackers drops as the minimum pollution count goes up. The faster a curve goes to zero, the more
resistant an AS is to attack.
The ASes in Figure 5.9 were chosen because they were all isolated within a tier-1 hierarchy.
Each AS graphed is at a different depth, where depth is defined to be the number of hops to the
nearest tier-1 AS. The depth metric was introduced in [11] and correlates with path length.
The first observation is that vulnerability increases with increasing depth, and that the concavity
of the curve actually flips between depth 1 and 2. A stub attached to a transit AS attached to a tier-1
AS is much more vulnerable than a stub attached directly to a tier-1 AS.
The next observation is that vulnerability is not constant for a target AS. The attacking ASes can
be strong or weak; in fact attacker aggressiveness has a strong negative correlation with attacker
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Figure 5.9. Vulnerability analysis graph – the faster a curve approaches zero, the
more resistant the AS is to attack. The Tier-1 AS curve shows high attack resistance.
There is less resistance by a stub at depth 1. Multi-homing shows a very slight
improvement over single-homing. The depth-2 stub shows a very large increase in
vulnerability as reflected in the change in concavity, and the depth-5 AS is even
more vulnerable to attack.
Figure 5.10. A comparison of attack vulnerability for ASes connected to tier-2
ASes. There is similar behavior as before with respect to depth, and in fact there
is a direct correspondence with the curves in Figure 5.9 when the two graphs are
overlaid with each other.
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Figure 5.11. Vulnerability of AS 98 (depth 1) and AS 55857 (depth 5) with and
without filtering of attacks from stubs. Filtering simply scales the graph down; the
curves retain their general shape.
depth. Simply put, shorter paths are preferred over longer paths. A secondary factor affecting
aggressiveness is the reach and overlap of the tier-1 ASes involved in the attacks where reach is
defined to be the number of ASes that can be independently reached from AS without the aid of
peer ASes [11]. There is also a very slight improvement in attack resistance when comparing ASes
that are multi-homed rather than single-homed, as seen in the curves for AS 98 and AS 35.
We performed the same experiments with ASes attached to large tier-2 providers. The results
are shown in Figure 5.10. These curves are very similar to the tier-1 cases, and in fact when overlaid
show only minor differences. The tier-2 curve lines up with the tier-1 curve, and the remaining
curves also show the same concavity as their counterparts. Normally a stub attached to a tier-2 AS
would be considered to be at depth 2. However experiments show it behaving the same as a depth
1 AS. This causes us to re-define depth to be the number of hops from an AS to its nearest tier-1
or tier-2 provider.
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Figures 5.9 and 5.10 display worst-case vulnerability. Another scenario could argue that transit
suppliers should know the prefixes announced by their direct customers and defensively filter any
bogus announcements from them. In reality, this doesn’t always happen, but we analyze this as an
optimistic case. Attacks now originate only from the 6318 transit ASes (14.7% of the total ASes).
Figure 5.11 shows the curves for AS 98 (depth 1) and AS 55857 (depth 5), with and without
defensive stub filters. As can be seen, the filtered curves simply scale down but keep their general
shape. We shall continue using the optimistic scenario in the remainder of this paper, but remain
mindful of the fact that the general situation scales back up towards worst case.
5.4. Impact of Private Peering and Internet Exchanges
The Internet is always growing and its topological structure continues to evolve. So far we
have focused on the hierarchical aspects of the internet – Tier-1 centric and Tier-2 centric net-
works. However this topology is becoming inter-mixed with more complex inter domain con-
nection schemes. The paper by Labovitz et al [27] points out that the internet is changing from
a hierarchical set of tiers to a denser topology of direct peering between content providers and
consumer ISPs. Internet Exchanges also appear more prominently in the mix. (See Figure 5.12).
The question to pose is whether this evolution make an AS more or less vulnerable to IP
hijacking.
Private peering between a content provider and a set of peer ASes can actually help protect the
peers from an attack on the content provider. This is due to the fact that router policy prefers a peer
relationship over information provided via a provider relationship. Any attacks that arrive via the
provider link will be ignored because of this preference rule. On the other hand, an attack from a
customer link will pollute the AS.
A simple before/after experiment was conducted to prove this point.
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Figure 5.12. Evolution of Internet Topology, from [27]
• BEFORE: An announcement from Google (AS 12145) was broadcast. The Colorado
State University (AS 12145) received the announcement and now holds a path to Google.
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We then attacked from Telia (AS1299) which is a Tier-1 provider. Colorado State Uni-
versity’s AS became polluted and could no longer reach Google.
• AFTER: We added a private peering relationship between Google and Colorado State
University by inserting one line into the database. When the experiment was run again,
the path to Google from Colorado State remained intact.
• BUT: A sword cuts two ways. In a subsequent experiment we had Colorado State Uni-
versity attack Level3 (AS 3356) which is also a Tier-1 provider. Because of the newly
installed peering relationship, Google accepted the announcement and lost its connection
to Level3 in favor of CSU. This points out that NO private peering relationship should
be made without a proper set of ingress and egress filters in the relationship. Typically
the two parties should know the address blocks that are allowed; however if either party
has a large number of customers who have their own customers, things can become very
complicated. ROVER, of course, is designed to help in this situation.
We now consider the situation when there is a very high level of peering. Hurricane Electric
(AS 6939) has 532 customers and peers with 2029 ASes. Attack experiments in which Hurricane
became polluted caused the peers to become polluted as well.
It is all well and good that the private relationship between Hurricane and its peers helps protect
their own ASes from an external attacker, but the two-edged sword can certainly create havoc if
either of the parties propagates an attack against someone else. Again, proper filtering or ROVER
protections should be put into place.
Internet Exchanges are simply scaled up peering relationships. Private peering is one-to-one.
Internet exchanges are many-to-many. Internet Exchanges create peering islands within a topology.
Since all members of the interchange are peers with one another, we can decompose the analysis
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to the one-to-one case and derive the same results. Within the exchange, members are protected
from external attack on their ASes. But if a member should accidentally propagate a bad route to
someone outside the exchange, or if a member were to initiate an attack, the high preference given
to a peering relationship causes the attack to propagate to all members.
The conclusion to all this is that peering is good for the peers, but could be bad for anyone not




Our thesis statement is “A system based on the existing DNS infrastructure can be deployed
by a small number of institutions in an incremental fashion and still effectively thwart origin and
sub-prefix IP hijacking despite non-participation by the majority of Autonomous System owners.”
We now examine this statement in more detail. In particular, we analyze the effectiveness of
various incremental deployment strategies regardless of whether the technology is ROVER-based,
RPKI, or even basic router filtering. We will then re-focus on the effectiveness of a ROVER-based
solution in Chapter 7.
The three sections of this chapter discuss attack prevention, attack detection, and “pragmatic
self-interest actions”. The first sections present some unexpected results which contradict expecta-
tions regarding the effectiveness of blocking attacks by Tier-1 ISPs only. The latter section provides
recommendations for deploying a solution with minimal participation by external parties.
6.1. Deployment Strategies for Hijack Prevention
Attack prevention implies that something exists to prevent a router from accepting and propa-
gating a bogus announcement. Examples include prefix filters, PGBGP’s use of historical data, and
router firmware or other device that compares announcements to a list of authoritative route ori-
gins obtained from a secure repository such as RPKI and ROVER. RPKI uses a set of repositories
for storing authorized route origins and protects them with a PKI-based certificate chain. ROVER
is a method for publishing route origins in the reverse-DNS and cryptographically protecting the
information with DNSSEC.
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Given a mechanism for checking BGP origin security and rejecting bogus routes, how many
ASes must implement this mechanism to achieve a high probability of stopping or at least mini-
mizing an attack? Can the ASes be chosen at random or must they be methodically chosen? To
address this question we ran a series of experiments against two of the typical stub ASes: AS 98,
which is at depth 1 and relatively attack resistant, and AS 55857, which is at depth 5 and is very
vulnerable. The experiments varied the location and number of ASes executing a mechanism for
bogus route blocking. The results are graphically displayed in figures 6.1 and 6.2.
We make the following observations regarding various incremental deployment strategies for
BGP security.
• Random Deployment: This experiment was run to simulate the real-world situation
where various random ASes are motivated to deploy BGP security on their own. Over
time, more and more ASes will be added to the mix. Although acting independently is
commendable, this is not a very good strategy in general. As can be seen from the two
charts, deploying bogus route blocking with 100 (1.6% ) or even 500 (8%) of the transit
ASes barely moves away from the baseline case where there are no protections. It is much
more effective and certainly less costly to simply deploy to the 17 tier-1 ASes.
• filter 17 tier-1 ASes: This scenario was run under the assumption that the tier-1 ASes can
act on their own, to everyone’s benefit. As it turns out, filtering at the tier-1 ASes does
improve the situation somewhat, but not enough. The average number of polluted ASes
for a successful attack on AS 98 is 5084 (12% of the total ASes). Only 162 attackers
are capable of pollute more than 15,000 ASes. The situation is worse for very vulnera-
ble AS 55857. The average number of polluted ASes for a successful attack is 22,018
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Figure 6.1. Comparison of defensive filtering for AS98 (depth=1, relatively attack
resistant). Random deployment of 100 or 500 filters has negligible to minor effect.
Filtering at Tier-1 Ases gives the first real gain, however filtering the core 62 ASes
with degree ≥ 500 shows the most marked improvement. Continuing gains are
made by adding more filters.
Figure 6.2. Comparison of defensive filtering for AS 55857 (depth=5, very vulner-
able). The same effects as in Figure 6.1 are seen, but starting from a much more
vulnerable starting point. In this case the 62 core filters show a great improvement,
and begin changing the concavity of the curve. However it still leaves the target
quite vulnerable. In this case we have to increase to 299 filters before the curve
shows major effect.
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(52%). Only 70 attackers pollute more than 34,000 ASes. The next strategy is to add
BGP security to successively more tier-2 ASes.
• filter 62 ASes with degree ≥ 500: Filtering just 62 core ASes does give a significant
gain. The average number of polluted ASes for a successful attack on AS98 is 1076
(2.5% of the total ASes which agrees with the results from [25]). However 60 attackers
can still pollute more than 8000 ASes and, as expected, AS55857 is still quite vulnerable.
The average attack pollutes 8562 ASes (20%) but only 42 attackers can pollute more than
22,000 ASes. As can be seen in Figure 6.2, the concavity of this curve has just flipped to
form a better defensive rate.
• filter 124 ASes with degree ≥ 300: Better. Attacks on AS98 have an average pollution
count of 378 and only 24 attackers can pollute more than 4000 ASes. Attacks on AS55857
have an average pollution count of 2716 and only 41 attackers can pollute more than
12,000 ASes.
• filter 166 ASes with degree ≥ 200: Even better. Attacks on AS98 have an average
pollution count of 228 and only 13 attackers can pollute more than 3000 ASes. Attacks
on AS55857 have an average pollution count of 1576 and only 53 attackers can pollute
more than 8,000 ASes.
• filter 299 ASes with degree ≥ 100: Excellent. Attacks on AS98 have an average pol-
lution count of 66 and only only 36 attackers can pollute more than 500 ASes. Attacks
on AS55857 have an average pollution count of 163 and only 23 attackers can pollute
more than 1,500 ASes. We observe, however, that despite the much improved results for
AS 55857 it is likely more cost-efficient to change this target AS to be less vulnerable by
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connecting to a lower-depth transit AS than it is to add security to an additional, possibly
reluctant, 133 transit ASes.
Although the situation has been drastically improved it is still not perfect. A clever attacker
may be limited on where attacks can be initiated and which ASes will be polluted, but can still
cause some damage. Which attacks are capable of slipping by these defenses? Consider the case
with 299 attack blockers deployed. For AS98, the top 5 still-potent attacks are:
ASN Name Pollution Degree Depth
11537 Abilene-Internet2 1025 87 1
25560 RHTEC backbone 895 94 1
20965 GEANT 839 61 1
20080 AMPATH Florida U 763 61 1
27750 Cooperacin 761 22 2
and for the vulnerable AS55857, the top 5 still-potent attacks are:
ASN Name Pollution Degree Depth
237 Merit 1822 37 1
46595 PVTN 1819 4 2
18592 U Desarrollo 1785 21 1
40498 NM LambdaRail 1779 13 1
3912 NMSU 1760 6 1
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Thus, an attacker armed with the same tools and knowledge of which ASes have deployed BGP
security can, within the limits of the simulation, plot the viability and value of a specific attack.
These attack simulations have enabled us to quantitatively analyze gains in security and also
show the remaining vulnerabilities. However, the question remains: will 300 or 200 or even 100
strategic ISPs implement BGP security? This could be like “Waiting for Godot”, who never shows
up (apologies to playwright Samuel Beckett). Given this possibility, we must consider another
strategy, attack detection, which is discussed in the next section.
6.2. Deployment Strategies for Hijack Detection
IP Hijack Detection implies the existence of a mechanism which monitors BGP messages from
a variety of world-wide vantage points and compares BGP prefix announcements to known good
data. Bogus announcements caught by a detector will cause an alert to be issued.
IP hijack detectors are only as good as the quantity, topological diversity, and geographical
dispersion of the vantage points (probes) they have available. Detectors are also limited by the
accuracy of their comparison data. For example, detectors that use historical data can issue false
alerts due to changing AS connectivity. Once again, it is prudent for ASes to securely publish their
route origins so that detectors can have an accurate source of data.
Detector effectiveness can vary dramatically; some detectors with many diverse probes will
capture most attacks. But we will see other detector configurations that can fail to detect large
numbers of incidents, even missing some attacks that capture 25% or more of the internet.
IP hijack detectors work by collecting real-time BGP data sources by peering with routers in
multiple ASes and/or by streaming data feeds from BGP data collectors such as CSU’s BGPmon
service [48]. The data streams are examined to compare their announced BGP prefix origins with
data from a repository of trusted authoritative origins (e.g. ROVER using DNSSEC) [12] or with
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historical data augmented with data plane verification (e.g. ARGUS [43]). If a mis-match oc-
curs, an origin or sub-prefix hijack is detected and operators are alerted to take corrective actions.
Any particular attack may be “seen” (i.e. received and propagated onwards) by one, multiple, or
possibly none of the BGP data sources which act as probes.
To analyze the effectiveness of hijack detectors, we conducted experiments on three different
detector configurations. The first configuration has data probes consisting of all 17 tier-1 ASes.
This was done under the assumption that a tier-1’s position in the internet topology would give them
wide visibility across the mesh of ASes. The second configuration was a real-world example: we
used the 24 ASes monitored by CSU’s BGPmon which is in turn used by several hijack detectors.
The final configuration we studied has probes consisting of all 62 AS routers with degree ≥ 500.
These large backbone networks are highly inter-connected and should also give good visibility to
attempted hijacks.
Each of these configurations was subject to 8000 random simulated IP hijacks. Attackers and
targets were chosen from the 6318 transit ASes. The results are graphed in Figure 6.3. The bar
charts indicate how many attacks were detected by zero, one, or multiple probes. For example, the
graph for Case 1 shows 425 of the 8000 attacks were seen by all 17 of the configured detectors.
The line chart shows the average attack size vs number of probes seeing the event. This slope of
the line confirms intuition; the larger the attack extent, the more collectors triggered.
The non-intuitive results we found were more intriguing, however. We make the following are
case-by-case observations:
• Case 1: 17 Tier 1 Probes
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Figure 6.3. Comparison of three detector configurations, each using different
source probes. Each configuration is subject to 8000 random attacks. The “0”
bar indicates the number of attacks completely escaping detection (0 probes were
triggered). Otherwise 1 or more probes detected the attack. In general, the more
probes triggered, the larger the attack, as indicated by the line graph. In the three
examples shown, Case 1 surprisingly fails to detect 34% of the attacks, Case 2
misses 11%, and Case 3 is the best, missing only 3% of the attacks.
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Surprisingly, this configuration gives very weak detection. 2,717 (34%) of the the 8,000
random attacks completely escape detection. Undetected attacks had an average AS pol-
lution count of 2,344 and a maximum of 20,306, (almost 50% of the internet). These are
very large attacks to have escaped detection. The top 5 undetected attacks are:






• Case 2: 24 CSU BGPmon Probes
This configuration is better. However, 879 (11%) of the the 8,000 random attacks still
completely escape detection. The average pollution count for these “invisible” attacks is
1,521 with the maximum at 12,542. This is a surprisingly large attack size (almost 25%
of the internet) to have escaped detection. The top 5 undetected attacks are:







• Case 3: 62 ASes with degree ≥ 500 Probes
This is a much more effective configuration, but still not perfect. Only 239 (3%) of the
the 8,000 random attacks completely escape detection. The average pollution count for
attacks escaping detection is 202 and the maximum is 2804 (attack extent at 6% of the
internet). The top 5 undetected attacks are:






How is it that AS 6450 can hijack AS 7314’s address space, pollute over 20,000 autonomous
systems, and still not be detected by the 17 tier-1 probes configured in Case 1? AS7314 is at depth
1 and is multi-homed to tier-1 provider 7018 and a medium sized depth-2 provider, AS 12083.
This results in all of the tier-1 ASes having a path length of 2 to AS 7314 (with the exception of
AS 7018 having a path length of 1). The simulator’s policy for tier-1 ASes is to prefer shorter path
regardless of whether the connection is from a peer or customer. Attacker AS 6450 is at depth 2
so it can’t replace the existing paths at the tier-1 ASes. Furthermore, AS 6450’s providers are AS
6939, AS 4436 and AS 22822, all which peer to thousands or hundreds of other ASes. This causes
high attack propagation. If tier-1 policy were different, then some of them may have detected the
attack.
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The smaller undetected attacks observed in configuration three are not straightforward to ana-
lyze. Animations of the polar graphs showing the attack propagation give some insight, but basi-
cally all we can say at this point is that the small amount of traffic during the attack propagation
never hits one of the probes. This is an area of future research.
Again, the numbers from the simulation should not be taken verbatim, but do provide general
guidance and insight. From this set of experiments it is logical to recommend that BGP detec-
tors peer with as many high-degree, non-overlapping ASes as possible, rather than with random
ASes, to maximize their effectiveness. The currently available coverage with BGPmon by itself is
insufficient for good detection, and we encourage more effective peering relations be established.
6.3. Pragmatic Self-Interest Actions
Bruce Schneier states, “Security is a process, not a product”. BGP security will not happen in
a single step, it will take a series of actions over time. But how much time? Rather than sit and
wait, responsible organizations can start to take pro-active actions immediately that improve their
own security and help others move this process along.
We next propose an approach that can help an organization reduce risk with respect to IP
hijacks. The process could be used by a concerned AS for increasing security for important cus-
tomers or by a regional advisory board to make recommendations regarding security of critical
infrastructure.
The general approach is to execute the following steps:
• analyze the relevant AS topology
• reduce vulnerability
• publish route origins and recruit other ASes to publish
• incorporate filters based on published data
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• use detection
Analysis: The first step is to examine the subset of relevant AS topology, listing end-point
ASes between users and services. Prioritize goals, don’t try to solve everything at once. As an
example, a bank may have world-wide customers whose internet traffic traverses multiple ASes,
but the bulk of the traffic is isolated to one geographic region. Start with that region and map the
ASes involved. Measure depth to assess potential vulnerability.
Reduce Vulnerability: The depth analysis may reveal some ASes to be more vulnerable than
others. If possible, increase resistance to attack by re-homing and multi-homing these ASes to
reduce depth , and to increase non-overlapping reach. If the AS is out of immediate direct control,
at least inform the AS of their potential vulnerability.
Publish route origins: This is a critical step. Publishing authoritative route origins in ROVER
and other secure repositories will enable accurate real-time detection as well as provide good data
for building prefix filters. Eventually this published data will be used in new routers and devices
to block bogus routes in real-time. But in the meantime, The simple act of publishing creates
leverage: as more organizations use detectors and filters based on published data, the more accurate
and comprehensive they will become.
Filter: Build prefix filters. Filtering is one of the only practical blocking technologies available
today. Filters should be based on authoritative data. Block the known prefixes of immediate
customers and set egress filters for your own address space. Add filters from securely published
route origin sources; initially these can be chosen based on the AS topology analysis. The list
could grow to include all published data At some point, however, this process may no longer scale
and this will encourage the incremental adoption of other hijack blocking technologies.
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Table 6.1. Local Protective Actions for AS55857
Action # of Polluted ASes from # of Polluted ASes from
Internal NZ attacks External attacks
(186 attackers total) (200 random attackers)
none 113 (60%) 28 (15%)
Filter at VOCUS 74 (40%) 26 (14%)
Re-home up 2 levels 46 (25%) 12 (6%)
Use detection: Subscribe to a service or run a local IP hijack detection program. But be an
active participant. Understand the set of probes used in the detector and run simulations to see if
there are any blind spots regarding relevant AS endpoints. If necessary, determine new probes that
can improve detection accuracy. Have an operational plan if an alert is generated.
Several experiments were conducted to validate these recommendations. We again used AS
55857 as an attack target because of its vulnerability. This AS is located in New Zealand, along
with 186 other ASes. We wanted to see if IP hijacking could be reduced just within the NZ region.
The first experiment re-homed AS55857 up two levels. In the second experiment we added a single
prefix filter to VOCUS, at AS 4826, based on the AS topology.
In the re-homing experiment, we reduced the average number of compromised NZ ASes from
113 (60%) to 46 (25%) based on attacks generated from each of the 186 ASes within the region.
We also ran a sample of 200 attacks from outside the region. In this case the average number
of compromised NZ ASes dropped from 28 (15%) to 12 (6%). In the filtering experiment we
reduced the number of compromised ASes caused by regional NZ attacks to 74 (40%). Attacks
from outside the region resulted in an average of 26 (14%) compromised NZ ASes. These data are
summarized in table 6.1.
Many more experiments could be conducted to determine if further improvements are possible.
This is an area for future investigation.
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CHAPTER 7
ROVER SYSTEM DESIGN CONSIDERATIONS
In this chapter we examine several important design issues that can affect ROVER-based ap-
plications. We also discuss criticisms and objections to ROVER put forth by RPKI adherents.
The most important design consideration focuses on system reliability and resilience. How
reliable can a ROVER system be, given its dependence on a potentially unreliable DNS service?
Furthermore, how do we know if the DNS is even capable of handling the additional load posed
by many ROVER devices? Will the system scale?
An analysis of these topics raise related questions. In addition to the DNS, what are ROVER’s
other external dependencies? What is its threat model? Can a ROVER system be made fault
tolerant?
To instill confidence in a complete ROVER-based solution, we must go beyond basic mech-
anisms and examine the surrounding eco-system. We must analyze potential failures and threats,
as well as day-to-day operational issues. A ROVER solution must be robust; that is, designed to
prevent failure. It must also be resilient, accepting that failure is likely to happen and is therefore
designed to detect failures and recover quickly from them. The following topics are examined:
• Threat Model and Failure Modes
• Operational Considerations
• Global DNS Capacity and Load
• ROVER criticisms and objections
The analysis and research experiments conducted in these areas have resulted in improvements
to the fault-tolerance of ROVER. More importantly, we demonstrate that the underlying DNS
infrastructure is fully capable as a method to publish and retrieve route origin data.
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7.1. Threat Model and Failure Modes
This section presents an analysis of the vulnerabilities and potential failures related to a ROVER
system’s external dependencies, specifically communication with BGP, DNS and the remote sub-
scriber. We will ignore hardware and operating system vulnerabilities as these types of issues are
well-documented elsewhere. We assume that the device has been built on a secure (or at least hard-
ened) operating system. Only the necessary ports have been opened, the system securely boots,
etc. The areas examined are:
(1) vulnerabilities with respect to BGP communication
(2) vulnerabilities with respect to DNS communication
(3) vulnerabilities with respect to subscriber communication
(4) system redundancy and fail-over
These four vulnerabilities are illustrated in Figure 7.1 with respect to an IP Hijack Detector
using ROVER technology. The small “devil” symbols indicate either an attack, such as a BGP
man-in-the-middle spoof or a DDOS attack, or a component failure, such as a DNS server being
offline and not returning a response to a DNS query.
Attackers craft exploits to take advantage of vulnerabilities. Example exploits include:
• If BGP communication can be blocked, a ROVER hijack detector may not see a bogus
announcement and no alarm will be issued.
• If an attacker can spoof the DNS traffic between ROVER and its resolver, all sorts of
problems can occur. This last communication segment is not protected by DNSSEC, so
false messages would not be detected. An attacker could trick ROVER into thinking an
attack happened when there was no attack, or conversely, mask a real attack by responding
with a fake SRO verifying the fraudulent origin. This invalidates all system reliability!
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• If a ROVER hijack detector can’t send an alarm to a subscriber because an attacker has
DoS’ed the communications link, the subscriber obviously won’t get the alarm. ROVER
may have done all the correct hijack detection, but fails to alert the affected parties.
The remainder of this section examines each of the four vulnerabilities using an example of a
ROVER-based IP hijack detector. The discussion will describe the basic threat or failure mode,
suggest possible defenses, and describe the results of any research experiments performed that
validate the defenses.
As always, there may be additional vulnerabilities and attack vectors that are unanticipated by
the designer. Security audits, penetration testing, and successful attacks will identify subsequent
protections and security measures that should be undertaken.
7.1.1. Vulnerabilities with respect to BGP communication. Vulnerabilities: A ROVER hijack
detector is completely dependent on receiving a constant real-time stream of BGP announcements
from each of its remote vantage points. These announcements may come from multiple routers
that have set up a peering arrangement with ROVER. Additionally, BGP announcements may also
come from a BGP message aggregator such as BGPmon [48] which streams data to users via an
XML telnet session.
• BGP Peering Issues: The Huston survey article [24] outlines multiple BGP session
vulnerabilities. There can be attacks with respect to authentication, spoofing, message
alteration, TCP replay, man-in-the-middle attacks, etc. Denial of Service is another attack
vector as BGP is built on top of the TCP protocol, and could be subject to SYN floods
and data floods.
• BGPmon Issues: BGPmon is a very practical source of BGP announcements. It provides
a single real-time stream of XML encoded BGP data from multiple world-wide BGP
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Figure 7.1. Block Diagram of ROVER-based IP Hijack Detector showing Potential
Vulnerabilities
router peers. One of its strengths is its ability to chain multiple services together into
one consolidated real-time data stream that removes redundant messages. Unfortunately,
there is no strong authentication associated with BGPmon. The connection between the
XML data stream and ROVER is via the telnet protocol. Telnet is not secure and can
be easily spoofed or altered with a man-in-the-middle attack. A stronger authentication
scheme is a necessity for a robust hijack detector.
Solutions: To protect against these attacks, the basic BGP session defenses described in [24]
should be incorporated into the ROVER detector device. A minimum level of defense is to use TCP
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MD5 shared-key authentication for all BGP peering. GSTM (generalized TTL Security Mecha-
nism) would add an additional level of security.
Some operating systems have network stacks with built in DDoS defenses. Otherwise the
ROVER application should log and alert for any disruption to BGP data transfers, keep-alives and
session flapping.
The BGPmon communication method could be improved via data authentication techniques.
However, an alternative defense against these attacks is to simply run a separate copy of BGPmon
directly inside the same system that the ROVER hijack detector is running. This internal copy
of BGPmon could maintain its own set of router peers, and could also chain to other BGPmon
collectors, identifying itself with its IP address and authorized via access control lists and other
authentication mechanisms. Furthermore, this internal copy of BGPmon now provides its XML
data stream to ROVER via telnet over localhost, avoiding external network communication.
A separate reason to incorporate a BGPmon application within the ROVER device is to enable
redundancy and failover. A ROVER hijack detector must have a continuous and reliable real-time
source of BGP data. If it is possible for the the data stream to be stopped or altered, the ROVER
hijack detector will be considered to be unreliable.
The most likely failure mode for an external BGPmon collector is to simply crash, or for its
network connection to drop or to be subject to a denial of service attack. From time to time the
BGPmon collector will be taken down for preventive maintenance. To accommodate these situa-
tions, an internal copy of BGPmon could chain to multiple geographically distributed redundant
copies of the external BGPmon collectors. Any single device could fail, but the data stream from
the other devices would still be available. Redundant data is removed by the BGPmon chaining
operation, keeping the XML stream to ROVER as straightforward and simple as possible.
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Experimental Results: The ROVER testbed was modified to incorporate a BGPmon applica-
tion within the Linux server running the detector application. This proves feasibility of chaining to
an external BGPmon service. No other peering or security experiments were conducted.
7.1.2. Vulnerabilities with respect to DNS communication. Vulnerabilities: Another critical
dependency for a ROVER-based hijack detector is in its communication with the reverse-DNS. In
general, the global DNS provides a robust and resilient publishing and data retrieval mechanism.
DNS is a mission-critical component of the Internet and is designed with redundancy and resiliency
in case of server or subnet failure. This is primarily handled by duplicating DNS data across
geographically dispersed slave servers. Data integrity is ensured via a DNSSEC cryptographic
signatures. Nevertheless, DNS doesn’t always work and there are several failure modes that need
to be considered:
• The DNSSEC “last mile” problem:
– A DNS answer is properly validated by the external DNS Cache server shown in
Figure 7.1, but the insecure communication link between the DNS Cache server
and the ROVER device has been compromised. A forged answer will be ac-
cepted by ROVER because there are no integrity checks at this point.
• No response, or SERVFAIL response, to a DNS query
– A DNS query fails to return an answer and times out. This could be due to DDoS
attacks at any of the authoritative servers or at the DNS Cache server illustrated in
Figure 7.1. It could also occur due to a server simply being unavailable. (Note:
This is not the same as DNS returning a validated response saying “no data
available” or NXDOMAIN. These situations still return responses, not timeouts
or SERVFAIL.)
129
– A DNS query is directed to a misconfigured server and returns a SERVFAIL.
– DNSSEC validation fails because of a spoofed man-in-the-middle attack and
returns a SERVFAIL.
Solutions: The “last mile” problem is easily solved by simply not using an external DNS
cache, thereby eliminating it as a dependency. Instead, the DNS caching resolver and DNSSEC
validator should be physically contained inside the same appliance and operating system as the
ROVER application itself. This completely eliminates the “last mile” because communication be-
tween ROVER and the DNS cache will be performed over localhost rather than some external
network link.
Using an internal resolver has a side benefit as well: it eliminates the possibility of a commu-
nication path failure between the ROVER application and an external resolver. UDP packets are
unreliable by nature and it is quite likely that responses to a DNS query will be dropped or altered
by an external network link. The internal resolver configuration is therefore more robust.
The “no response” issue can be addressed with a variety of mechanisms, each strengthening
the overall system. Mechanisms include DNS caching, ROVER database, DNS Cache preloading,
DNS Cache prefetching, threading for asynchronous parallel DNS queries, and exponential re-try
mechanisms after a DNS query failure.
• DNS Caching: The first solution is to take advantage of the caching mechanism contained
in the DNS resolver. Responses received by a resolver will be stored in internal cache
memory until the response ages out (TTL expiration) or is forced out due to other caching
activity. This suggests that the DNS cache SHOULD be large enough to hold all the DNS
responses associated with a complete router RIB table.
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Storing a ROVER record in the DNS cache provides two benefits. Performance will
improve because data can be retrieved in microseconds rather than the typical time of 100
to 500 milliseconds or even longer when timeouts occur. Furthermore, if the data is long-
lived, the data can be retrieved from cache even if the authoritative source of the data is
under a DDoS attack.
TTL’s are typically in the range from minutes to hours, depending on how stable the data
is. The TTL for NS records at in-addr.arpa, for example, is 1 day. The TTL’s at
ARIN are typically 1 hour. The TTL for colostate.edu’s PTR record is 10 minutes.
Note, however, that these examples are no guarantee of long life. At some point the data
will no longer be in the cache and a ROVER DNS query will have to communicate with
the external DNS authoritative servers. Although a response is usually received, there is
no guarantee.
• ROVER database: To enhance reliability, all ROVER-based systems should maintain an
internal database storing information for each IP prefix that it has processed. This data-
base provides a backup mechanism in the event that a DNS query fails to retrieve an
answer. It is also a mechanism to enumerate known ROVER data and enable iteration.
New items are added to the database as ROVER processes BGP announcements contain-
ing ‘never been seen before” IP prefixes.
The database entries are indexed by IP prefix. The data associated with the IP prefix
includes a a timestamp indicating the last time the data entry was written, a flag indicating
whether an SRO record, RLOCK, or no ROVER data exists for that prefix, the SRO data
fields or RLOCK prefix, and the DNS TTL. The TTL is informational only; it is not used
to remove entries from the database.
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The ROVER database will be empty the first time a ROVER device is started up. To
“prime the pump”, DNS queries can be issued using a list of IP prefixes obtained from
an Oregon RouteViews RIB table [38]. These queries will load information into both the
ROVER database and the DNS cache.
Although this database may seem redundant to the DNS cache, it actually contains extra
information not present in the DNS cache. In addition, the database is persistent in that it
never expires and data entries are refreshed as new BGP messages are processed.
The database is used in cache pre-loading and in the event of a DNS timeout or SERV-
FAIL, as will be described below.
• DNS Cache Preloading and Reloading: To increase performance, and to potentially avoid
future DDoS problems, it is wise to preload the DNS Cache on system re-start. This can
be done by performing DNS queries on each and every known prefix by iterating through
the ROVER database. As new data is retrieved, the ROVER database is also updated.
Cache “reloading” may also be useful as a reliability mechanism. Every N hours an-
other iteration can be performed to issue DNS queries which refresh the DNS cache and
database.
• Prefetching: This is a mechanism available in some DNS cache servers (e.g. UNBOUND
and SECURE64) to aggressively maintain fresh data in the cache. Pre-fetching is triggered
whenever a query is made for a record that is about to expire from the cache, typically
within the last ten percent of its TTL. The pre-fetch mechanism issues a new set of author-
itative queries to refresh the cache and reset the TTL even though the original cache entry
hasn’t expired yet. The requestor’s query is answered immediately, of course, because it
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is a cache hit. The end result is that“popular” DNS records are always available in the
cache.
This mechanism has limited use for ROVER. One benefit is that performance is faster for
frequently queried IP prefixes. Additionally there is a remote possibility that pre-fetch can
help in the event of a TIMEOUT or SERVFAIL. Consider the case where a DNS record
has a 24 hour TTL. If a query is made within the last 2.4 hours (last ten percent of the
TTL), the query will get the cached response and the DNS server will try to pre-fetch new
data. If A DDoS attack is occurring, that request is likely to TIMEOUT. But the data is
still in the cache and will be available for 2.4 hours. If the DDoS attack stops within that
time window, no harm will be done. The next query will get data.
Although pre-fetch helps in this particular sequence of events, is a very unlikely scenario.
Better mechanisms to deal with TIMEOUTs and SERVFAILs are needed instead.
• Asynchronous queries: Experiments with the ROVER testbed demonstrated a wide range
in the incoming query rate of BGP announcements. At times there were only 5 announce-
ments per second. At other times there were 500 or more incoming BGP announcements
per second. Each of these incoming announcements requires an associated DNS query.
These queries should not be performed serially. Although most queries will be answered
instantaneously (if in cache), or within a few hundred milliseconds (if a cache miss), some
queries will not be answered at all and the DNS server has to wait for a pre-determined
timeout. The DNS server then re-queries the same authoritative server that failed as well
as alternative authoritative servers. The entire process can take seconds until the DNS
server finally gives up and a final timeout is returned to the ROVER application. This is
far too long to wait, as hundreds of other BGP announcements will potentially queue up
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awaiting their turn to do a DNS query. If several more time out, the entire system may
never be able to catch up.
The solution to this problem is to do the same thing that a DNS caching resolver does:
perform asynchronous queries via threading or some other parallelization mechanism.
One method is for the ROVER application to use hundreds of worker threads to process an
announcement and perform the associated query. This keeps the system running smoothly.
If any particular query gets bogged down, the other announcements are still able to be
processed by the other workers.
• Exponential Retry: Despite all of the mitigation mechanisms described above, we finally
must face up to the situation where the ROVER application simply fails to receive a reply,
and instead receives a TIMEOUT or a SERVFAIL. The ROVER algorithm requires that
the BGP announcement be accepted as INSECURE (neither proven BOGUS, nor proven
SECURE).
But what if the timeout were due to a DDoS attack or to a temporary failure? A query per-
formed at a future time may prove that the BGP announcement is SECURE or BOGUS.
How can this be handled?
Two different methods are possible, exponential query re-try and using the ROVER data-
base as a backup mechanism.
– Exponential retry involves placing the failed announcement on a special queue
which retries the query multiple times, typically with exponentially slower inter-
vals between queries. In the case of a SERVFAIL, the timing interval may have
to be long because many DNS caching servers typically store a SERVFAIL for
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five minutes. Asking any sooner just results in a cache hit and returns SERV-
FAIL immediately. If the DNS Cache server has a configuration variable for
SERVFAIL TTL, it should be set to zero.
If, after multiple retries, there is still no response, an IP hijack detector will sim-
ply have to give up and accept the INSECURE announcement. On the other
hand, if it receives a response indicating BOGUS, it can still issue an operator
alert, although it will be somewhat delayed. The message to the operator should
indicate that this is a delayed alert and contain the timestamps for both the orig-
inal announcement and the time it was actually detected.
We have been primarily discussing IP hijack detectors. The situation for a
ROVER application directly connected to a router to prevent it from accepting
BOGUS announcements is somewhat trickier. If the router has already accepted
the BOGUS announcement, and later finds out that the announcement was BO-
GUS, there met be some ”undo” mechanism which forces the router withdraw
the announcement.
– The second mechanism for dealing with a TIMEOUT/SERVFAIL is to take ad-
vantage of information in the ROVER database described earlier. If a query fails
to return data, ROVER can examine the database to determine if a prior query
for the IP prefix had successfully returned an SRO or RLOCK. If not, then re-
turning a response of INSECURE is appropriate since the previous response was
INSECURE. On the other hand, if the previous query had successfully retrieved
ROVER DNS records, then this is a strong indication that something is wrong.
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Normally one would expect to retrieve the same data, updated data, or an indi-
cation that the data had been removed. A timeout or SRVFAIL could now be
interpreted as an attack.
In this situation ROVER should examine the timestamp of the record and its
TTL. If the record is still within its TTL limit, it should use this backup data to
validate the record just as if it had come from the DNS. If the record has expired,
ROVER could issue an alert to its subscribers indicating “high probability” for
an attack (as opposed to its normal message indicating “definite hijack attempt”).
Operators could then take manual steps to determine the root cause of the inci-
dent. It is likely the subscriber is having other problems if their DNS is being
attacked.
Finally, if there is no data in the database, then this is a newly announced prefix.
A warning should also be issued in this case.
Experimental Results: The ROVER testbed was modified to incorporate an internal DNS
resolver to eliminate the last mile problem as well as UDP communication failures. Experiments
with a lossy network to an external cache resolver resulted in many UDP drops causing query
timeouts. These were eliminated when the resolver was incorporated within the ROVER appliance.
Exponential retry was also implemented. The data networks remained lossy for seconds at a
time, indicating that the retry mechanism should be maintained for several minutes.
Experiments were performed to iterate through a RouteViews RIB to perform 400,000 queries
to preload the DNS cache. This took approximately five minutes using 200 parallel threaded
queries. This could be easily shortened by provisioning more worker threads. Further details of
this experiment are provided in Section 7.3.
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The ROVER database was not directly implemented because there were too few actual ROVER
records in the live Internet. As a related experiment, however, a comparison to a historical data-
base was implemented. ROVER issued different messages depending on whether the data failed
the actual ROVER test, or whether it failed a historical comparison. This experiment led to the
evolution of the ROVER database idea.
7.1.3. Vulnerabilities with respect to Subscriber Communication. Vulnerabilities: The com-
munication link between an IP hijack detector and a subscriber can be compromised in two ways:
fraud and outage. Fraud can occur via a man-in-the-middle attack in which messages between the
detector and the subscriber are altered. An outage can occur due to DDoS, network failure, or by
an actual IP hijack of the address space for the detector or the subscriber – the detector is taken out
by the very method it is supposed to detect!
Solutions: Both of these issues can be solved by defining a secure communication protocol
between the detector and the subscriber. The ROVER testbed, for example, sends data to its sub-
scribers via a telnet connection which issues an XML data stream. Telnet, however, does
not perform any authentication and has no provision for data integrity. This can be solved by ei-
ther replacing telnet with a secure connection protocol (SSH) or by encrypting the XML data
stream.
SSH would require login credentials at the ROVER appliance for each subscriber. Doing this,
however, creates more problems than it solves; for example, a user with login credentials could
exploit OS vulnerabilities and wreak havoc. Therefore we propose a method using data encryption
to solve authentication and data integrity:
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• ROVER publishes a public key in the DNS using a DANE resource record as specified
in IETF RFC 6698 [20] . This makes the public key accessible to anyone who wants to
subscribe.
• When a new connection is established, ROVER generates a symmetric key, encrypts it
with its private ROVER key, and sends this encrypted key as the first XML message to
the subscriber. This is similar to the method used by web browsers communicating via
SSL.
• All subsequent XML messages are encrypted with the symmetric key.
• The subscriber uses the public key to decrypt the symmetric key. If everything is valid,
the remaining messages will decrypt properly. If a fraudulent or altered message arrives,
it will not decrypt and an alert can be logged and sent to the subscriber.
The key (pun intended) to solving authentication and data integrity basically lies in ROVER
maintaining a well-protected private key and associated public key to establish its unique identity.
We now examine DDoS, hijacks, and other issues which stop messages from arriving at a sub-
scriber. Earlier papers, notably PHAS [28], attempted to solve this problem by sending alerts to a
subscriber via multiple email addresses. This technique assumes that at least one of the subscriber’s
mail servers, perhaps one in a separate address block, would still be accessible. Other suggestions
have been to send notifications via technologically differing mechanisms such as email and SMS
text messages.
None of these solutions is particularly robust. As an alternative, we propose a mechanism
based on communication using the XML data stream. Each subscriber must run a local “XML
Receiver” program to parse XML messages and take appropriate actions:
138
• After parsing a message, the receiver discards the message if it is irrelevant to the sub-
scriber (e.g. a hijack of someone else’s address space may not be of interest).
• The ROVER detector sends periodic “keep-alive” messages as part of its XML stream.
• The receiver sets a session timer whenever it receives a “keep-alive”. If this timer should
expire before receiving another “keep-alive”, a communication failure has occurred. This
failure event should be logged and an alert sent to the subscriber.
• Messages of interest, such as a hijack of an address owned by the subscriber, can then send
an alert to the operator by any desired technique, including SNMP traps, SMS messages,
email, etc.
In other words, this “keep-alive” technique uses the absence of a message to detect a broken
communication path. If the communication path becomes compromised, the subscriber will be
alerted and can perform checks to see why the link is broken. This may be an IP hijack, DDoS
attack or other problem with the network. In any event, action can be taken.
Experimental Results: The ROVER testbed was modified to issue periodic “keep-alive” mes-
sages and the receiver was able to parse and process these messages. No experiments were per-
formed with encryption, as these are well-understood capabilities.
7.1.4. Redundancy and Failover. Vulnerabilities A single point of failure is any part of sys-
tem that stops that system from working if the component should fail. A fault-tolerant system
must not have any single points of failure. Furthermore, a robust system should accommodate
component outages due to preventive maintenance, upgrades, etc.
An examination of the block diagram in Figure 7.1 identifies several points of failure. BGPmon
could go down, ROVER could be turned off for maintenance, and so forth.
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Figure 7.2. Block Diagram showing improvements for security and redundancy
Solutions An improved block diagram with redundant components is shown in Figure 7.2. In
this diagram there are two BGPmon services, and a failover ROVER appliance as well. These
ROVER devices may act in parallel, rather than failover mode, since the subscriber receivers are
capable of removing and de-duplicating messages from its senders. Although not shown in this
diagram, it may be useful for the subscriber to have redundant XML receiver programs.
Diagram 7.2 also shows improvements to the ROVER device that have been discussed earlier.
Each ROVER device has an internal DNS cache resolver/validator, as well as an internal BGPmon
program that can directly peer to external router vantage points and chain to BGPmon services.
Experimental Results No experiments were conducted for redundancy. This topic is well
understood in general and is included here for completeness.
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7.2. Operational Considerations
Several design improvements to the ROVER resource records were implemented after analyz-
ing an operator’s work flow for inserting, removing and transferring route origin information.
When an operator first publishes route origins in the reverse-DNS, it is likely that mistakes are
going to be made. If so, there is a risk that ROVER devices will access the erroneous data and
perhaps block routes or cause false alarms at detectors. To prevent this, the operator needs to be
able to try experimental publishing that poses no risk.
Another issue involves changing a prefix from one AS to another. An operator cannot simply
change the published SRO statement and update routers. The old SRO statement may still be
cached in ROVER DNS resolvers around the world, waiting for the TTL to expire. The new record
will not be queried until then. If the operator changes the router AS without publishing a new SRO,
the route will be detected as BOGUS. The TTL is creating a classic “damned if you do, damned if
you don’t” situation.
To address these issues, a new draft 02 of draft-gersch-grow-revdns-bgp [13] was
submitted on February 25, 2013. The draft defines modifications to the SRO and RLOCK records
that incorporate new fields besides the route origin. These include flag, activation time, and prefix-
limit fields.
The flag field is currently unused, but is there to allow for future expansion. The activation
time field is used to handle experimental publishing and to aid in the transfer of an IP prefix from
one AS to another. As we stated in the IETF document:
The purpose of the Activation Time field is to permit publication of SRO records in the reverse
DNS prior to its use in formal route validation. This enables two key capabilities: first,it allows
for the testing of RLOCK records in a safe manner by informing an application to “don’t validate,
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but tell me what you would have done”. Second, it allows an ISP to publish an RLOCK and
SRO record that defines a large covering prefix to give advance warning to that ISP’s customers.
Customers that have their own AS number and a delegated address block within the ISP’s larger
block may want to publish their own SRO record if they share a zone with the ISP, or they will
risk having their announcements being marked INVALID because the ISP has claimed a larger
covering prefix. Alternatively, the customer may be independent from the ISP’s zone and manage
their own reverse-DNS zone that has been delegated to them. In this case they may choose to
publish an SRO record or to do nothing. The cut point of the zone delegation stops the ISP’s
covering prefix from extending into the new zone.
We had also considered including an expiration time field to indicate when the SRO or RLOCK
was no longer valid. In fact, this would be a very useful device for ROVER reliability – the ROVER
database would store information for an IP prefix that would potentially be valid for a very long
time, perhaps months or years. The problem is that operators make mistakes. It is very likely that
no one will change an expiration date even after the record expires. If this were to be implemented,
an automatic provisioning system would be needed to refresh the expiration dates. Otherwise some
sort of warning mechanism would be needed to alert operators to update their zone files.
In any event, it is easy to remove or modify a record from the reverse-DNS if an operator no
longer wishes to publish route origins or is changing delegations. So it isn’t really necessary to
have an expiration time in the ROVER resource records.
The prefix-limit field was added to the SRO record due to an experiment in which ROA records
from RPKI were translated to their equivalent SRO form. ROA records implement a prefix-limit,
and originally it was thought that this would not be necessary for ROVER because a zone cut
would stop the effective coverage of an RLOCK statement. This turned out to be impractical for
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Figure 7.3. The Reverse DNS tree showing fanout from the root to lower-level au-
thoritative DNS servers
IPv6, however. Consider an IPv6 /48 prefix that needs to protect all sub-prefixes up to /64 but not
beyond. This would require 65,536 NS statements (zone cuts) to be present in the zone, which is
clearly impractical. Simply adding a prefix-limit to the SRO statement eliminated this problem.
7.3. Global DNS Capacity and Load
Every BGP route announcement will cause ROVER to issue DNS queries for the associated
SRO and RLOCK records. Some of these will queries will be answered immediately from the
DNS resolver’s local cache. If the data is not locally available, then the DNS resolver will issue
recursive queries to globally distributed DNS authoritative servers to assemble its response.
These authoritative servers are a critical dependency for ROVER functionality. But will these
servers be able to handle the increased load from ROVER queries? in this section we examine the
expected load and compare it to the capacity of these authoritative servers.
Figure 7.3 displays the reverse DNS tree structure and shows how rapidly these names fan out
to different zones. Although there are 255 different entries at each level, multiple zones are often
managed by one organization. RIPE, for example, owns several blocks of addresses, ARIN owns
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a different set, and so forth. The same thing occurs at lower levels as multiple ISPs may own
several different address blocks. Experiments have shown total fanout of the reverse-DNS tree is
shared among approximately 50,000 DNS servers. Note, however, that this does not imply 50,000
separate organizations. Name servers are typically master/slave pairs. RIPE and ARIN have six
way redundancy. And even these 6 separate servers per zone file may be backed up with anycasted
servers to create additional capacity and redundancy.
Resolving a reverse-DNS name requires multiple queries to these authoritative servers. As
an example, the domain name associated with Colorado State University’s NETSEC lab is
138.82.129.in-addr.arpa. If nothing were in the DNS resolver’s cache, it would take 5 recursive
queries to resolve the name, each query traversing the next lower level in the reverse-DNS tree.
On the other hand, the first three layers of the DNS tree are typically long-lived in the resolver’s
cache memory. Therefore a query for the NETSEC lab will usually only require two authoritative
queries: one for the 82 subdomain and one for the 138 subdomain.
We now examine a worst-case scenario. Given a freshly-started ROVER device with nothing
in its DNS cache, what will happen when it issues 400,000 queries as it iterates through a RIB to
pre-load the ROVER data base and DNS cache? How many authoritative queries will be issued,
how far will they fan out? Which authoritative servers get the heaviest load?
A Python program was written that performed DNS lookups on a full RIB table. The program
performs 400 parallel-threaded queries for each prefix in the RIB. Parallel queries are required
because the average response time of a query varies widely, from 30 milliseconds to many seconds,
depending on failures, timeouts, retries, SERVFAIL conditions, etc. It is unacceptable to wait for
a single query to finish before beginning the next. This analysis represents a naive DNS lookup
system. Modern DNS servers can do tens of thousands of parallel queries to name servers.
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Figure 7.4. Results from DNS Query Experiment
Figure 7.5. Query Distribution vs # Servers
The program averaged about 1000 queries per second and completed in 7 minutes. The query
load fanned out to 50,000 DNS name servers world-wide, as illustrated in Figures 7.5 and 7.6. As
expected, the main servers at RIPE, ARIN, and the other RIR’s were the most referenced DNS
servers, and then the queries fanned out widely.
Figure 7.4 shows the number of queries generated. The first row shows data for an empty DNS
cache (cold start). A second run was performed immediately thereafter (warm start) and is shown
on the second row. In each case 401,970 prefixes must be authenticated.
145
Figure 7.6. Table of Most Popular Servers Queried
In the cold-start case, a total of 754,567 DNS lookups were issued; approximately 2 queries
for each prefix, one for the SRO (which may not found) and one for the RLOCK. In the process
of looking up a record, one needs to learn the authoritative name servers (NS lookups) for the
146
reverse zones. A total of 1,206,038 authoritative name server lookups were preformed as part of
the normal DNS resolution process. Since the cache was cold, one would expect a large number of
cache misses (there were 552,686 misses in total). During the lookup process, subdomain names
are cached and 201,868 of the recursive domain name queries become cache hits due to previous
queries.
The queries usually returned with “domain found, but no SRO record available”, or with NX-
DOMAIN or even SERVFAIL responses. There were a total of 214,391 NX domain responses and
34,929 server fails. 3415 of the name servers learned were lame. Note these results come from the
existing reverse DNS and are consistent with past DNS studies.
The second row is similar to the first, except the now the first experimental run has loaded the
DNS resolver’s cache. The number prefixes to lookup remains the same. The number of queries
issued varies slightly due to DNS retries; different queries will try different authoritative servers.
Additionally some queries from the python program to the resolver were lost over the network.
This result shows experimental evidence for the resiliency improvements discussed earlier.
The number of cache hits increase dramatically due to data being present in the cache. There
are some cache misses (58,958) due to cache dynamics. In particular, SERVFAIL responses have
expired from the cache. The number of NXDOMAIN, SERVFAIL, and LAME servers remains
consistent since both experiments use the same real reverse DNS.
While this may seem like a lot of queries, the DNS system is designed for speed and redun-
dancy. Many of the servers, especially those at RIRs such as RIPE and ARIN, are ANYCASTed
to handle large loads. To illustrate, the worst case for a query load to a single name server at ARIN
was a total of 195k queries out of the total 1.2 million. Over 420 seconds, this is only 464 queries
per second, a very light load for a system designed to handle world-wide DNS queries.
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At the other end of the DNS tree, the reverse-queries have fanned out widely. This is evident
in Figure 7.6 as it shows the query rate dropping rapidly as the load fans out. It is also evident
in Figure 7.5, which shows that approximately 14,000 DNS servers get only one query, and an
additional 20,000 DNS servers only get two queries. Therefore we can conclude that ISP’s will
hardly notice any increased load to their DNS service.
Now assume that 1000 ROVER devices all schedule a RIB iteration at the same time. ARIN
would receive 464,000 queries per second. This is significant, however the ARIN DNS servers are
provisioned to handle millions of queries per second. The lower-level DNS servers at ISP’s and
enterprise organizations receive a much lower load, 1000 or 2000 queries over seven minutes. This
is easily handled by modern DNS servers.
Finally, it must be noted that this entire scenario happens only infrequently. The normal DNS
load will simply be driven by the BGP update rate. Experiments from the ROVER testbed have
shown a range from 5 to 600 prefixes processed per second, as these come from the CSU BGPmon
service peered with multiple routers. A standalone router would be nominally in the range of 1 to
30 updates a second, with occasional bursts if it needs to process a RIB transfer. These rates are
very low compared to the capacity of the DNS. Therefore we conclude that global DNS capacity
is not a problem, and even if it were, the DNS is quite capable of scaling larger.
7.4. ROVER Criticisms and Objections
ROVER has been presented to global audiences at IETF, NANOG, RIPE, and other venues.
This has given us an opportunity to listen and respond to questions and criticisms raised by atten-
dees, primarily those associated with the RPKI effort. Their concerns focus on:
• lack of enumeration,
• a perceived circular dependency between BGP and DNS,
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• lack of provenance data,
• potential business relationship gap in certain DNS sub-delegations.
We address each of these in turn.
• Lack of enumeration: RPKI proposes a mechanism for an ISP to retrieve collections of
ROAs (Route Origin Authorizations) in an offline manner, typically once per day. This
mechanism constructs a static dataset of route-origins that can be enumerated and indexed
by AS number. A separate protocol transmits this dataset to a router to determine BGP
announcement validity.
ROVER has been criticized for its inability to construct an enumerated list directly from
the DNS. This, in general, is a true statement. The DNS does contain a search capability;
one must know the exact domain name and RRType to retrieve data. It is impractical,
if not impossible, to search the entire reverse-DNS tree to build an enumerated list of
SRO records. The RPKI objection is that ROVER cannot therefore work without having
a pre-built list of origin authorizations.
This objection has at least two counter-arguments. The first is that ROVER applications
do not necessarily need an enumerated list. Route origins are retrieved on demand in
near real-time. This allows for much more dynamic data modification. Additionally,
ROVER applications cache DNS records and construct a database of route origins learned
from ongoing route-announcements. This builds the equivalent of an enumerated list as a
complete RIB is traversed.
• Circular dependency: Occasionally a question is raised doubting that a low-level pro-
tocol, BGP, should rely on a higher-level protocol, DNS. The typical example is a hypo-
thetical restart of the entire Internet. Routers cannot access the DNS during the reboot
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process since no routes have been established yet. Therefore BGP cannot have a circular
dependency on DNS.
In fact, this is true. BGP should not rely on DNS. In the case of ROVER, however, this
circular argument does not apply.
The fail-safe mechanism of ROVER requires that routers be allowed to establish routes
even when ROVER is not available. Routing will work just as it works now (with no
routing authentication) until DNS connectivity is established. At that point routes can be
re-checked by iterating through the ROVER database.
Additionally, the ROVER database and DNS cache contain a local storage of ROVER
route origins. Even during a global re-boot of the Internet, these data can be referenced
for authentication.
Given the fail-safe mechanism and local storage for resiliency, the circular dependency is
moot.
• Provenance: ROA certificates have a chain of signed signatures from which one can
determine the ownership and provenance of a particular address block. For example, one
could follow a signature chain from RIPE to ISP-X to ISP-Y to determine who owns an
address block and from whom it was assigned or allocated.
Provenance is, simply put, not a primary objective of the ROVER design. Provenance is
not necessary to prove address block ownership. The DNS delegation mechanism is suf-
ficient and is simpler to manage than a PKI infrastructure which must manage certificate
revocation and other PKI operational issues.
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On the other hand, address block ownership is a desirable attribute, and it is certainly
conceivable that future enhancements to ROVER could accommodate DNS records which
contain address block ownership information.
• DNS sub-delegation: An objection was raised regarding certain DNS delegation chains
when certain address blocks are sub-divided. As an example, organization A could split
its /20 into two /21 blocks and assign one of them to organization B. Later, organization
B could sell part of its space to organization C. If the delegations cross an octet bound-
ary, organization C must send a DNSSEC DS record to be stored in the zone owned by
organization A, not to organization B. The problem is that organization C may only have
a business relationship with organization B. If organization A receives a DS record from
organization C and does not have a business relationship with C, they may not accept the
DS record. This breaks the DNSSEC chain of trust.
Simply put, the situation just described is not a ROVER issue. This business relationship
issue is known to occasionally occur as a consequence of basic DNSSEC delegation op-
erations, with or without ROVER. The problem can be resolved by simply establishing
a business relationship from organization C to A when the delegation is first made by
organization B.
7.5. Conclusion
ROVER uses the reverse-DNS as a global distribution mechanism to publish and retrieve route
origin data. The basic properties of the global DNS create a compelling reason for its use. It scales,
it is performant, it is resilient, allows for dynamic updates, and has been proven in public use for
decades.
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Despite these advantages, the DNS is subject to possible communication failure or attack. The
reverse-DNS by itself cannot be completely relied upon to alway return a response. For that matter,
no Internet publication method can be deemed entirely reliable.
To compensate for this, ROVER combines the use of the reverse DNS with several failure
recovery mechanisms. The DNS cache and the ROVER database are available for immediate
local lookup of ROVER data. Exponentially timed re-queries attempt to retrieve data. In the
event that a query fails, the historical transactions contained in the ROVER database are consulted.
If the historical SRO record matches the BGP prefix announcement, it is allowed to pass, but
marked INSECURE. A log entry and operator notification is issued indicating whether the BGP
announcement matches the historical ROVER data; if not, the operator receives a warning message.
The end result of combining DNS data retrieval, local storage, and operator notifications is a
resilient system with significant reliability. As a final note, we recall the ROVER design objective
to fail safely. Even if the ROVER system is entirely disabled, the global BGP system will continue




This dissertation introduced the ROVER (Route Origin VERification) approach for detecting
origin and sub-prefix route hijacks. ROVER provides a mechanism to securely publish authorita-
tive route origins in the existing reverse DNS infrastructure. To accomplish this, ROVER intro-
duces a naming convention that provides a unique DNS name for an IPv4 and IPv6 prefix. Network
operators authorize the prefix to be announced and specify an origin AS by placing a Secure Route
Origin (SRO) record at the prefixs DNS name. An additional RLOCK record is used to indicate
whether the prefix is using the ROVER publishing approach. This published data may then be used
in a variety of applications to detect or prevent IP hijacks.
This dissertation also presented an analysis and quantification of the global internet topology
with respect to IP Hijack propagation. Two new metrics were introduced, depth and reach. These
were shown to correlate well with the extent of an IP hijack. We also presented an analysis of
the effectiveness of incremental rollout of BGP security mechanisms. An empirical analysis using
simulation enabled us to characterize AS vulnerability to route origin hijacks. Wide variance of
attack resistance and attack aggressiveness was observed. This variance most strongly correlated
with the depth of an AS. We then demonstrated that prevention and detection technology can be
effective with incremental rollout. The ability to block IP hijacks increases non-linearly when
more blocking mechanisms are deployed, however a small critical mass is required to enable a
reasonable level of protection. We also demonstrated that hijack detection can be highly effective,
but that once again a critical mass of probes must be present to avoid blind spots, Finally, we
proposed a set of short-term actions that could be taken to initiate incremental BGP security rollout.
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This approach would have immediate benefits to self- interested AS organizations and help build
towards the critical mass needed in general.
Finally, this dissertation presented an analysis of ROVER with respect to its external depen-
dencies, and potential weakness and vulnerabilities that could be exploited by an attacker. The crit-
ical dependence on the reverse-DNS was analyzed regarding reliability, capacity and scalability.
Operational considerations revealed design shortcomings. These studies resulted in architectural
improvements that make the ROVER system robust, resilient and reliable.
8.1. Contributions
Novel work is as follows:
(1) The survey of IP hijack detection and prevention papers led to the development of the
solution taxonomy given in Section 2.3. The economic arguments pitting ASes with high
risk versus the majority of apathetic ASes was fundamental to the argument for incremen-
tal deployment.
(2) ROVER: the design of the ROVER naming convention which allows delegation, the
evolution of the resource record extensions, and the development of a working, robust
ROVER validation algorithm are contributions to the overall ROVER architecture.
(3) the Web-based ROVER TESTBED allowed world-wide users to experiment with ROVER
concepts and view real-time ROVER hijack detection as a working application. Addi-
tionally, the testbed module for publishing zone files is a unique contribution due to the
manner in which brings up a tree structure of address blocks and previously seen AS an-
nouncements. As this testbed evolved it helped us understand the shortcomings in the
validation algorithms and resource records as well as identifying resilience and reliability
issues. This testbed has the potential for commercialization.
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(4) The Global Internet Simulation program, its underlying database of AS information, and
the graphics programs for producing polar charts and Hilbert maps were indispensable
in the analyses performed. We believe these tools could be commercialized for use by
organizations who wish to analyze their own attack vulnerability and implement self-
interested defenses. Of course, the tools could also be used to craft more sophisticated
attacks as well.
(5) The research results regarding Internet measurements, vulnerability analysis and incre-
mental defense deployment defenses are new contributions. The depth and reach metrics
are introduced in this dissertation. Although one could argue that these are nothing more
than indicators of path length, but in fact they provide a novel way to determine AS vul-
nerability through metrics associated with the AS position in the Internet topology.
(6) The analysis method regarding ROVER robustness and resilience demonstrates a process
for dealing with a system which starts out with fundamental reliability issues and shows
how it becomes more robust by analyzing weaknesses, threat models and operational
considerations.
8.2. Future Directions
There are many fruitful areas of research, development and refinement than can be pursued in
the future. Among these are:
• Numerous experiments and more involved statistical analyses could be proposed to de-
velop a deeper understanding of attack vulnerability and defensive measures. Future work
is required to understand the behavior of the internet topology with respect to the holes
still present in an incremental deployment. Even with a deployment of critical mass
ROVER devices, some origin and sub-prefix attacks will still get through, and possibly
155
remain undetected. An analysis is desirable to understand these attacks, to determine how
they remain invisible, and what can be done short of complete global deployment of BGP
security at every AS.
• Origin and sub-prefix hijacks are the most common IP hijacks, but as pointed out in chap-
ter 2 there are certainly other issues to resolve. There are ideas worth pursuing regarding
other IP hijacks including techniques for next-hop validation, full path validation, and
routing valley detection.
• Determine methods for a ROVER application to communicate directly with routers to
enable real-time authenticated hijack filtering. It may be possible to use the RTR protocol
(RFC6810: RPKI to Router Protocol). It may be possible to replace bogus announcements
by having the ROVER application announce a better route, or some other technique may
need to be proposed.
• One of the the most fruitful areas for future research would be in the area of “pragmatic
self-interest” discussed in Section 6.3. How does an ISP ensure that its customers will not
be hijacked? A process involving AS topology mapping, vulnerability analysis, simula-
tion, and defense strategies could be a practical outcome.
• Finally, the actual effort to get ROVER deployed and accepted as a world-wide ad hoc or





This work has resulted in a combination of publications in IEEE academic conferences, peer
reviewed presentations, operational venues such as the North American Network Operators Group
(NANOG) and other similar regional groups, preliminary standards discussions in the Internet
Engineering Task Force (IETF), and international attention focused on ROVER by government
organizations, tier-1 ISPs, enterprise organizations and others.
ROVER has been presented to the ISOC Outreach Committee (Internet Society), the U.S. Fed-
eral Communication Commission CSRIC Working Groups (Communications Security, Reliability
and Interoperability Council) where J. Gersch is a member of CSRIC working group 4 and C. Gar-
ner of Century Link is a member of CSRIC working group 6. Discussions on implementing and
evolving ROVER have been held with Century Link and Level3 over the last year. M. Glenn of
Century Link has presented ROVER to their government customers as well as other conferences.
Interest in ROVER is also indicated by the organizations that have signed up for the ROVER
experimental testbed including Hewlett-Packard, ATT, Century Link, Internet2 members, and oth-
ers. This level of global interest demonstrates the impact the ROVER technology is creating and
its potential for future deployment either as a de jure or de facto future standard.
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